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INTRODUCTION
It is an undeniable fact of life that most parents have sex lives. Yet as a society we are
at least partially committed to shielding children from exposure to sexuality and sexual
conduct.I For the most part, it is left to parents to determine how to carry on their sex
lives while protecting their children's innocence.2 But when parents separate and custody
or visitation of the children is contested, courts are permitted, if not required, to review
and assess each individual's performance as a parent. When this happens, courts may
examine an adult's sex life and its relationship to that individual's suitability as a parent.
This judicial examination and assessment has proven to be particularly problematic for
lesbian or gay parents and for their children. Many people, including many judges,
perceive lesbians and gay men as exclusively sexual beings, while heterosexual parents
are perceived as people who, along with many other activities in their lives, occasionally
engage in sex.' The mere identification of a parent as lesbian or gay, quite apart from
proof of any sexual conduct, may become a relevant factor for the court. Beyond
questions of sexual identity, lesbian and gay sexual conduct frequently provokes special
judicial concern. Conduct which would be deemed irrelevant to parenting abilities if
engaged in by two adults of opposite sexes (holding hands, for example) may become
determinative when it involves two adults of the same sex.
4
This Article examines the approaches courts currently use in assessing the relevance
of sexual identity and sexual conduct in determining parental entitlement to custody and
visitation. It focuses primarily on the analysis of legally recognized5 lesbian or gay
parents.6 These parents face the most searching analysis by courts, and their custody
1. I view the commitment as partial because our commercial culture is highly sexualized and, as a result, children
are constantly exposed to sexual imagery, much of it through advertising. See. e.g., Elizabeth Jensen, It's 8 P.M YourKids
Are Watching Sex on TV, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,1995, at BI.
2. Under limited circumstances, the state, invoking its parens patriae power, may intervene and challenge the
performance of a parent. See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
3. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling. Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal
Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 537-46 (1992).
4. I am not concerned here with instances in which parents involve their children in sexual conduct, but only those
in which the child is exposed to parental conduct which takes place without any participation by the child. Exposure may
be direct, as when the child views the parents involved in affectionate or intimate sexual practices, or indirect, as when
the child is simply aware that the parent is involved in a sexually intimate relationship.
5. By "legally recognized parents" I mean adults whose entitlement to claim legal status as a parent has been
recognized by our judicial system. This includes individuals who have legally adopted a child, and, in most cases, the
biological parents of a child. An unmarried father, though the biological parent of a child, may not be recognized as the
legal father. See. e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (recognizing husband of mother rather than biological
father as legal father of child); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of denying any legal
recognition to unmarried biological father); see also Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and
Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1391 n.54 (1994) (adopting terms "legal" and "nonlegal" to describe
lesbian mothers). The distinction between legal and nonlegal parents has been critical and problematic for lesbian and gay
couples raising children within their relationships. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, 78 GEO.
L. J. 459 (1990); see also Robson, supra.
6. Custody cases reveal a striking pattern of differential treatment with regard to men and women. The vast majority
of cases involving judicial scrutiny ofnonmarital sexual relationships concern sexual activity of mothers. By contrast, few
courts inquire into the sexual activities of fathers. This may reflect a differential standard-one that permits sexual activity
for men, perhaps because it is a natural attribute of masculinity, but punishes the sexually active woman. Yet, any analysis
must also take account of the fact that in most cases the mother is the children's primary custodian. Assignment of the
primary custodial role to mothers, however, may itself be another aspect of differential treatment of men and women.
Courts might be particularly concerned about sexual relationships the child will be consistently exposed to and learn
from-those with which the child lives. Thus, the pattern noted above could result from heightened judicial supervision
of custodial parents, most of whom happen to be women. While these questions are certainly interesting and important,
they are well beyond the scope of this Article. For my purposes here, it is enough to note that, consistent with this pattern,
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claims raise a wide array of concerns. Lesbian and gay parenting has become a
controversial public topic within the last several years, as is evidenced by high-profile
cases warranting extensive popular press coverage7 as well as proposed legislation and
ballot initiatives that have incorporated specific restrictions on the rights of lesbian and
gay parents.9
The last twenty years have seen a marked shift in the approach taken towards lesbian
and gay parents.9 Courts have been increasingly unwilling to adopt rules which explicitly
disadvantage all lesbian or gay parents involved in custody cases. e Instead, many courts
have endorsed a more individualized approach, one that is linked more directly to an
analysis of the best interests of the child. At first blush, this would appear to be both
another example of our society's increased tolerance of lesbians and gay men as well as
a source of reassurance for lesbian and gay parents.
Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions this shift has been largely superficial. While it
may be true that not all lesbians and gay men are automatically disqualified in custody
cases, individual lesbians and gay men routinely lose custody and instead receive
restricted visitation simply because they are lesbian or gay. The promise of individualized
consideration focused on the best interests of the child has not been fulfilled. Ignorance
and prejudice too frequently combine to distort the analysis of custody cases.
To gain a broader understanding of the problem of parental sexuality in child custody
cases, I also examine the treatment of unmarried, but sexually active, heterosexual
parents." While these parents do not share all of the concerns that arise with lesbian or
gay parents, they do share many of the principal concerns that motivate courts. It is not
unusual for courts to buttress their analysis in cases involving lesbian and gay parents
with references to cases involving heterosexual parents who engage in nonmarital sex.1
2
At the same time, I do not wish to understate the difference between the positions of
these two groups of parents. While discrimination against unmarried cohabiting
heterosexual couples occurs, 3 it is far less widespread than discrimination against
the majority of cases discussing same-sex relationships involve lesbian mothers rather than gay fathers.
7. For example, dozens of newspapers and popular weeklies prominently featured coverage of Sharon Bottoms'
custody dispute with her mother. See, e.g., William A. Henry M, Gay Parents: Under Fire and on the Rise, TIME, Sept.
20, 1993, at 66; Bill Hewitt & Stephanie Slewka, Fighting for Tyler: A Lesbian Loses Her Son to Her Own Mother,
PEOPL , Sept. 27, 1993, at 71.
8. The voters of Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington considered legislative measures aimed at
lesbian and gay parents during 1995. In addition, Initiative 167 in Washington would ban adoptions by all but married
couples. Similar initiatives have been introduced in other states.
9. The shift parallels strides made in securing general civil rights for lesbians and gay men.
10. This is due in no small part to the concerted efforts of organizations like the National Center for Lesbian Rights
and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. But see Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (holding
that lesbian conduct is an important consideration in determining the parent's unfitness in a custody case).
11. If a parent remarries and engages in a sexual relationship with a new spouse, courts show little or no concern.
Indeed, heterosexual parents who have engaged in nonmarital sex may redeem themselves by marrying their lovers. See.
e.g., Marriage of Simmons, 487 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). But heterosexuals who consistently engage in nonmarital
sex may incurjudicial scrutiny similar to that imposed on lesbians and gay men. Of course, since lesbians and gay men
are not permitted to marry, all lesbian and gay sexual relationships involve nonmarital sex.
12. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510,512 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Ketron v. Ketron, 692 S.W.2d
261 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985)); Fox v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1995) (citing Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d 1375 (Okla. 1984));
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391,394-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979)), cerl.
denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (Va. 1985) (relying on Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d
89 (Va. 1977)).
13. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska) (holding that discrimination
against unmarried couples is unlawful), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
880 P.2d 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding right of landlord to refuse to rent apartment to unmarried heterosexual
couple).
19961
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
lesbians and gay men. 4 Cohabitation by unmarried heterosexual adults is now widely
accepted. No political movement has organized around a basic commitment to restrict the
rights of cohabiting heterosexuals. 5 It is therefore not surprising that some courts that
have deprived lesbians and gay men of custody or merely permitted restricted visitation
may have been much more generous in cases involving heterosexual parents. This does
not evidence any real difference in the abilities of individuals as parents. Instead, it is a
reflection of the relatively greater acceptance of heterosexual cohabitation.
The failure of courts to analyze properly issues of sexual identity and sexual conduct
unjustly and inappropriately penalizes lesbian and gay parents as well as some unmarried
heterosexual parents. But parents are not the only ones harmed by the courts' failure to
develop and apply consistently an appropriate analysis of sexuality, sexual conduct, and
its relevance to parenting. When courts allow prejudice and anxieties about sexual mores
to overwhelm other evidence in a custody case, they stray from the goal of determining
the best interests of the child. The needs of the particular child are marginalized,
distorted, or entirely obscured. Whether courts are motivated by a desire to enforce
perceived societal norms, by stereotypical and uninformed views of lesbians and gay
men, or by a sincere, if misguided, desire to protect a child, the result is the same:
Children are unnecessarily removed from loving and secure homes where they have been
thriving, or their contact with a caring and concerned parent is needlessly and
unreasonably constrained. Thus, the failure of the judicial system to develop and adhere
to the appropriate test harms not only the nonconforming parent but also the child. This
Article is an effort both to illuminate the problem and to propose a solution.
Part I of this Article presents an overview of some general family law
principles-reviewing the various circumstances under which a court may intervene in
a parent-child relationship. These principles range from initial custody and visitation
decisions, which typically occur arthe time of separation or divorce, to termination of
parental rights and adoption proceedings. It is in these varied legal contexts that the
questions of sexual conduct and parental status arise.
Part II delineates the dominant tests used to assess parental sexuality and sexual
conduct, as well as many other parental traits. Most authors and courts have identified
two basic tests. One-a per se rule-disqualifies all parents found to engage in particular
conduct or to exhibit particular characteristics. The other-a nexus test-requires
individualized analysis of conduct in a particular case and its effect on the particular child
with the ultimate result left to the trial judge's discretion. Closer examination of the case
law reveals that there are actually three tests. Two distinct types of cases have been
conflated within the per se rule. While both types disadvantage lesbian and gay parents
and their children, one analysis obliges all trial courts to deny custody to these parents
while the other merely permits that result. Part II discusses the three distinct approaches
currently in use.
Part II concludes with an observation about the current problematic state of the law.
Though most jurisdictions have moved away from rules which explicitly incorporate
14. For example, victimization of lesbians and gay men, through verbal harassment or physical assault, is the most
common kdnd of bias-related violence. Scott L. Hershberger & Anthony R. D'Augelli, The lmpact of Victimization on the
Mental Health and Suicidality of Lesbian. Gay and Bisexual Youths, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 65, 65 (1995).
15. By contrast, in 1994, initiatives restricting the rights of lesbians and gay men were introduced in 10 states.
Although none of the initiatives were successful, similar initiatives have been introduced or announced in a number of
states this year. At least two 1996 presidential candidates-Pat Buchanan and Robert Doman-made opposition to rights
for lesbians and gay men a prominent part of their campaigns.
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negative assumptions about lesbian and gay parents and have embraced the general
principles of the nexus test, the nexus test is not consistently or effectively applied.
Instead, many courts appear to engage in a free-form assessment with neither analytic
rigor nor guiding principles, with results that are, even for family law, disturbingly
arbitrary. Many lesbian and gay parents still lose custody or face restricted visitation
simply because of their identity or conduct, without regard to its impact, or absence
thereof, on their children. Countless more live in understandable fear that if they turn to
the courts to seek custody or visitation, they will be treated harshly.
Part III examines in greater detail the particular problems with nexus-test cases. Close
examination of the cases demonstrates that, in reality, many courts are not consistently
and carefully applying a nexus test. This Part of the Article identifies ways in which
courts subvert proper application of the nexus test.
Part IV considers the underlying concerns that motivate courts in cases involving
parents who are lesbian or gay or who engage in nonmarital sex. These concerns drive
courts to adopt per se rules which eliminate all parents in a particular category or deny
custody even without evidence of harm or, in a less extreme form, render courts unwilling
or unable to-conform to the requirements of the nexus test. Some of these concerns are
relevant only to lesbians and gay men, while others may relate to all parents who engage
in nonmarital sex. After exploring each of the motivating concerns, this Part examines
the extent to which that concern can be justified. In part, this requires review of the social
science literature exploring the validity of the concerns. This Part concludes that, to the
extent judicial concerns arise from a genuine interest in the welfare of children; there is
no evidence to support them. They are, therefore, misguided. To the extent judicial
concerns arise from bias or stereotypical images of particular types of people, they are
illegitimate and should have no bearing on the determination of child custody.
The Article concludes that the correct approach to questions of parental sexual identity
or sexual conduct is a carefully designed and applied nexus test focusing on the conduct
in question and its relationship (if any) to the welfare of the child. Part V describes such
a test in more detail, discussing each of the features that must be part of a meaningful
nexus test and various procedural safeguards that should be adopted to make it work.
These proposals are designed to ensure that a system intended to serve the best interests
of children can achieve its goal in a wider variety of cases.
I. BASIC FAMILY LAW BACKGROUND
At the outset, it is useful to review the different contexts in which the legal
relationships between parents and children come before courts and the different legal
standards that are generally utilized in each context. Issues concerning parental
characteristics or conduct, including parental sexuality and parental sexual activity, may
arise in each of these contexts, but the legal significance of characteristics or conduct may
vary with the context.
First, and most prominently, when the legally recognized parents of a child separate
and form separate households, a court may be called upon to determine which of the
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parents should have custody of the child. 6 In making this determination, the court will'
conduct an inquiry 7 aimed at determining what is in "the best interests of the child."'
This inquiry generally compares the parents to determine who is "best," though certain
characteristics disqualify a parent by rendering that parent unfit.
There is a widespread and strong preference for awarding custody to a legally
recognized parent.'9 This preference rests on two assumptions. First, there is a strong
presumption that a child is better off with a biological or legally adoptive parent than
with a more distant relative or stranger.2" Therefore, consistent with the best interests of
the child, custody with one of the child's legal parents is preferred. Second, this
preference may be understood as a recognition of a parental right to the custody and
companionship of the child.2' The only other individual who can claim a similar right is
the other legal parent.22 This results in a presumption in favor of the parents of the child
as against others. In the event of a contested custody battle between a legally recognized
parent and a nonrelative, no individualized inquiry into the best interests of the child is
generally required.' Instead, the inquiry will focus on the fitness of the parent and
whether the parent abandoned the child.24 For the most part, the same approach is
followed even when the custody battle is between a parent and a grandparent or other
close relative.
16. Separating parents may determine custody of their children without the participation of a court. If the parents
never married, they can dissolve their relationship and arrive at a private agreement as to custody of any children. If the
parents cannot agree, however, either may bring the matter to a court. For married parents, the chances of relying solely
on a private resolution of custody are, at least in theory, slender. If parents seek a legal decree of divorce, the court will
inquire into the arrangements made for custody of any children. The fact that the parties may have reached an agreement
regarding custody does not prevent court review of the arrangement. Practically, however, court review may be a formality
in cases where the parties agree.
17. The court may conduct its inquiry through the ordinary adversarial process used in most civil proceedings.
However, it is increasingly common for the court's inquiry to be supplemented by appointment of an individual to
represent the child's interest, thus significantly altering the traditional adversary model.
18. See, e.g., Faries v. Faries, 607 So. 2d 1204,1209 (Miss. 1992) ("(T]he polestar consideration in matters of child
custody is the best interest and welfare of the child."); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 60 (W. Va. 1985) (same); UNIF.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACr § 402 (1973).
19. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Medaris, 612 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671, 673
(Miss. 1973); Stuhr v. Stuhr, 481 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Neb. 1992); Black v. Glawson, 442 S.E.2d 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Malpass v. Hodson, 424 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1992); In re Sedelmeier, 491 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1992). But see White v.
Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990) (affirming removal of child from lesbian mother's custody in favor of
grandparents); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (same).
20. See, e.g.,McIntyre, 612 N.E.2d at 1068; Stuhr, 481 N.W.2d at 216; Malpass, 424 S.E.2d at 470. But see Black,
442 S.E.2d at 79 (holding that parental unfitness is not an appropriate inquiry in a dispute between a parent and a
nonparent; instead, the court should determine best interests of the child, although there is a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the parent); Robson, supra note 5, at 1389 n.52 (same); Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third
Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody Is Constitutionally Prolected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705 (1986) (discussing limited
instances in which parental privileges have not been recognized).
21. Uhing v. Uhing, 488 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Neb. 1992); Sedelineter, 491 N.W.2d at 88. Under appropriate
circumstances, this is a right of constitutional dimension. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
22. Ruthann Robson has demonstrated, in seeking to identify a child's legal parents, that the law for the most part
operates on the assumption that children have two parents, one male and one female. Robson, supra note 5, at 1392.
23. One jurisdiction utilizes a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the child are served by custody with
a natural parent, but requires court inquiry into the best interests of the child. Black, 442 S.E.2d at 80.
24. See McIntyre, 612 N.E.2d at 1068; Bubac v. Boston, 600 So. 2d 951, 956 (Miss. 1992); see also LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 133 (West 1993); Westbrook v. Oglesbee, 606 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1992) (stating that the child's
preferences for the grandmother as custodian does not overcome a presumption in favor of fit father). But see Black, 442
S.E.2d at 79 (stating that parental unfitness is not an appropriate inquiry in a dispute between parent and nonparent;
instead, the court should determine the best interests of the child, although there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the parent). This case may be part of a developing trend to elevate the importance of the best interests analysis over the
commonly recognized entitlement of biological parents. See discussion supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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At the same time a court determines custody, it generally determines visitation rights
of the noncustodial parent. In most jurisdictions, visitation is not granted or denied based
solely on consideration of the particular interests of the child. Courts generally presume
that some visitation is in the best interests of the child and also recognize a parental right
to visitation.25 Thus, visitation is more a matter of right than is custody and cannot be
denied as easily. Visitation usually will only be denied where it can be shown that it
would be detrimental to the child.26 Courts may, however, impose restrictions or
limitations on visitation that are designed to shield a child from any perceived potential
harm. 27 Supervised visitation is perhaps the most widely used limitation.
Once custody and visitation have been judicially determined, they can only be changed
through a procedure for modification. Generally, a motion for modification can be filed
at any time.2 Because stability is crucial to a child's development, a moving party must
frequently meet a higher standard to obtain modification than the initial custody or
visitation decision. Courts usually require proof of both a material change in
circumstances and proof that the proposed modification will serve the best interests of
the child. The burden rests with the moving party, and it is sometimes greater than a mere
preponderance of the evidence." It is therefore generally more difficult to obtain custody
via modification than it is to obtain custody in the first instance.
Unrelated to any separation of a child's parents, the state may initiate proceedings to
terminate the parental rights of a particular individual or to remove a child from her or
his custody." Proceedings for termination or limitation of parental rights differ markedly
from those involved in a clash between two parents or even between parents and other
relatives.' The opposing parties are parent and state. Because the state has no legally
established relationship with the specific child3 2 and because termination and limitation
proceedings bring the state within the protected sphere of the family, the state must
satisfy a substantial burden before a child will be removed from the parent's home."
25. Lyons v. Lyons, 591 N.E2d 1006 (11. App. Ct. 1992). Visitation may also be a statutory entitlement. See, e.g.,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(a) (1989).
26. Duann v. Dunn, 609 So. 2d 1277,1286 (Miss. 1992) (stating that visitation of a child with husband and his lover
cannot be restricted without evidence that visitation would be harmful). For cases dealing with custody, see Bubac, 600
So. 2d at 956 and Malpass v. Hodson, 424 S.E.2d 470, 470 (S.C. 1992). Indeed, interfering with a noncustodial parent's
visitation may be a basis for changing custody of the child. See In re Shanklin, 484 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992); Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992).
27. See. e.g., Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
28. In some states the standard for assessing a motion for modification will vary depending on the amount of time
that has passed since the original order was entered. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.340(1) (Baldwin 1992).
29. The precise standards used may vary widely. See Treutie v. Treutle, 495 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(requiring a showing of clear and convincing evidence for modification); Westbrook v. Oglesbee, 606 So. 2d 1142 (Miss.
1992) (stating that modification requires the moving party to show material change in circumstances plus that a
modification would serve the best interests of the child); Ludwig v. Burchill, 481 N.W.2d 464, 469 (N.D. 1992) (same);
Blatske, 487 N.W.2d at 609 (requiring showing of"significant need" to modify custody); Harris v. Harris, 832 S.W.2d
352,353 (Tenn. CL App. 1992) (requires showing material change of circumstances); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300,
301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (requring material change in circumstances). But see McMillen v. MeMillen, 602 A.2d 845
(Pa. 1992) (allowing modification without change in circumstances if it is in the best interests of the child).
30. In one common scenario, the parent may be denied custody but still retain some parental rights. Typically, the
state then designates an individual to provide foster care for the child.
31. Termination proceedings invoke state power via parens patriae rather than private dispute resolution. Robert H.
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1975, at 226, 230-46 (1975).
32. The state intercedes by invoking its general parens patriae relationship with all children. See id. at 24044.
33. This burden may well be constitutionally mandated.
[W]e have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended if a State were to attempt to force
the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing ofunfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest.
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Typically, the state must show that the parent is unfit or has in some way neglected,
endangered, or abandoned the child.34
On some occasions, an individual who is not a legally recognized parent may seek
custody in opposition to a parent and unrelated to any legal separation of the parties. As
one might expect, given the preference for custody with a legally recognized parent, it
is generally much more difficult for a nonparent to obtain custody than it would be for
a parent to do so.
35
Finally, individuals may seek to establish a legally cognizable relationship with a child
through adoption. In this circumstance, the court must determine whether the petitioning
adult is qualified to be a parent. 36 Unlike a previously recognized parent, however, a
prospective adoptive parent has no preexisting legal claim to the child. In addition, before
any adoption can be finalized, the rights of any previously recognized parent must be
curtailed or terminated.
37
Consistent with the preference accorded to the legally recognized parents, 8 the
prospective adoptive parents and the initially recognized parents are not compared, and
the best interests of the child are not analyzed. 39 The first stage of the analysis is to
consider the termination of the original parents' parental rights. This requires a showing
of unfitness or some similar failing. Once this is done, the court will consider the
qualifications of the adoptive parents.40
A parent's sexuality or sexual activities may be at issue in any of the proceedings
discussed above. It may be considered a bar to custody or visitation, a factor to consider
in designing custody and visitation orders, a circumstance justifying modification, proof
of unfitness sufficient to justify removing a child from the home, or a factor which
disqualifies one from being an adoptive parent.
Sexuality or sexual activities may be given different weight in different legal contexts
within the same jurisdiction depending both on the strength of the preference in favor of
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,747-48 (1982) (requiring clear
and convincing evidence).
34. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). In most circumstances the state will remove custody from
a parent and wait for a period of time to allow the parent to attempt to rectify whatever problems led to the proceedings
before seeking to terminate parental rights.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
36. Note, however, that this is not an inquiry made when people simply have children.
37. An exception is made for stepparent adoptions, where the original parent retains parental rights and the new
spouse also acquires them. Some courts have also permitted second parent adoptions-the equivalent of stepparent
adoptions-with an unmarried (usually lesbian) couple. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re
Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Surrogate's Ct. 1992); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). But see ln re Angel
M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (denying a second parent lesbian adoption).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
39. Family law is constantly evolving and new standards replace old ones. This may be particularly true as to the
relative rights of biological parents and adoptive parents. Within the last several years, two widely publicized cases have
pitted adoptive or potential adoptive parents with whom a young child had resided for virtually its whole life against a
biological father who asserted his parental rights due to the genetic contribution he had made to the child. See DeBeer v.
Schmidt (In re Clausen), 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App.) (the "baby Jessia" case), affd, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993);
lt re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) (same case in a different jurisdiction); see also In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324
(1Il.) (the "baby Richard" case), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599 (1995). In each case, the courts ultimately ruled in favor of
the biological father and declined to conduct a best interests analysis. Particularly after the Illinois case, the public reaction
to the court proceedings was immediate and sustained. The reaction contributed to passage of a statute altering the analysis
that would apply in such a case and mandating that a best interests of the child analysis be conducted under these
circumstances. Diane C. Lade, Adoption Reform in Works; Legislators to Try Again to Reforn State's Laws, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 21, 1996, at BI.
40. There is no recognized right to become an adoptive parent, although considering classes ofpeople as ineligible
to adopt might raise Equal Protection problems. See Felicia Meyers, Note, Gay Custody ad Adoption: An Unequal
Application of the Law, 14 WHITTIER L. REv. 839, 851-53 (1993).
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a biological parent and the status of the opposing party. For example, in Doe v. Doe, the
Virginia Supreme Court considered a case in which the father sought to have his new wife
adopt his child. The mother of the child was a lesbian. The court held that the mother's
sexual identity and the fact that she lived with her lover did not, in and of themselves,
justify terminating her rights.4'
Four years later in Roe v. Roe, the same court was required to analyze the legal
significance of the same factors (a parent's homosexuality and residence with a lover) in
a custody case between two parents. In this context, the court concluded that these factors
not only justified but actually required a denial of custody and an award of extremely
restrictive visitation.
42
The Virginia Supreme Court confronted the question of sexuality and parenting for a
third time in Bottoms v. Bottoms, 43 a widely publicized custody dispute between Sharon
Bottoms, a lesbian mother who lives with her lover, and Kay Bottoms, Sharon's mother.
The trial court, invoking Roe, awarded custody to Kay Bottoms with restricted visitation
to the lesbian mother. The Virginia Court of Appeals distinguished Roe as pertaining to
disputes between two parents, rather than between parent and grandparent. 4 Since she
was seeking to obtain custody from a parent, the court concluded that the grandmother
was required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Sharon Bottoms was an
unfit mother. 45 Following the lead of Doe, the appellate court concluded that the mother's
sexual identity and the fact that she lived with her lover did not, in and of themselves,
show that she was unfit." Examining the specific evidence with regard to the child at
issue, Taylor Bottoms, the court found that the grandmother could not satisfy her burden
and hence, custody should remain with the mother.47 On review, the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court, reinstating the trial court's order granting custody to
the grandmother. The court relied on, and apparently expanded, the reach of Roe."' Thus,
Doe, Roe, and Bottoms, all from the same jurisdiction and analyzing the same factors,
demonstrate that the legal context in which questions arise may be important.49
This Article focuses mainly on how issues of parental sexuality or sexual conduct
figure in custody disputes between parents.50 Because of the preference accorded to
legally recognized parents, a legally recognized parent involved in a custody dispute with
a child's other legally recognized parent5e ' is, as a general matter, in a weaker position
41. 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
42. 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985). For a more detailed discussion of Roe, see infra text accompanying notes 77-84.
43.457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
44. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 280 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102.
45. Id. at 280.
46. Id. at 281.
47. Id. at 280-82.
48. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108-09 (Va. 1995). Bottoms may expand Roe because it applies the
presumption of favoring the parent in the context of a dispute between a parent and nonparent.
49. While the appellate court in Bottoms chose to harmonize Roe and Doe, the Supreme Court did not attempt to do
so. The cases may be fundamentally inconsistent, in that Doe requires evidence of harm while Roe explicitly denies the
need for any such evidence. See Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat Me Not To Leave Thee ": Bottoms v. Bottoms and the
Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 289, 312-14 (1994); see also Yvonne A.
Tamayo, Sexuality, Morality, and the Law: The Custody Battle ofa Non-Traditional Mother, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 853
(1994).
50. It is increasingly rare for sexuality to be used to justify state termination of parental rights or parental custody.
But see In re Breisch, 434 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
51. Generally, no more than two parents can be legally recognized at any given time. Courts have simply dismissed
the idea that a child might have three or more parents. See Justice Scalia's opinion in the Michael H. v. GeraldD. case.
491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989); see also Robson, supra note 5, at 1385"(criticizing limitations on the number of parents who
can be recognized).
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than when in a custody dispute with the state or a nonparent.12 Thus, it is in determining
custody cases between legally recognized parents that courts make the most searching
examination of parental characteristics and have the broadest discretion to intervene and
define parental rights. A satisfactory analysis for consideration of sexuality and sexual
conduct in custody disputes between legally recognized parents will equally apply to
termination proceedings and actions involving individuals who are nonparents. The
reverse is not necessarily true; for example, Virginia does not consider a mother's lesbian
relationship to be a basis for terminating parental rights, but it does consider it a basis for
determining custody between parents or between a parent and a grandparent.3 Such an
analysis could also be expanded to cover adoption proceedings.' 4
One additional procedural point deserves mention. In most family law cases, trial
courts have broad discretion both as finders of facts and as assessors of the characters and
needs of the individuals before the court. The guiding precedents often state principles
only in general terms, like the best interests of the child. Thus, it is relatively unusual for
a trial court to apply the wrong standard because, generally speaking, a trial court can
justify any result in a custody case and is little constrained by the law. Further, the
court's assessment of the facts is usually thought to be beyond appellate review. Hence,
it is hardly surprising that appellate review is generally quite limited and that trial court
discretion is correspondingly broad. 5
II. GENERAL APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF
SEXUALITY AND PARENTING
In recent years, virtually all states have either judicially or legislatively recognized that
an overarching goal of child custody proceedings is to advance the best interests of the
child. While agreement on the desired end is nearly unanimous, agreement on the best
means to achieve this end is notably lacking. Among the fundamental questions dividing
courts, legislators, and particularly scholars is whether the interests of children are better
served by adopting relatively rigid rules that constrain the discretion of individual judges
or by granting the trial judge broad discretion in assessing the best interests of the child
in each case.1
6
52. In selecting this focus I necessarily omit consideration of many critically important problems of lesbian and gay
parents, including disputes between lesbian legal and nonlegal mothers and those between lesbian parents and sperm
donors. See Robson, supra note 5, at 1391-1408.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
54. For example, if lesbian parents are not uniformly unfit to be custodial parents of their own children, it follows
that lesbians are not uniformly unfit to be adoptive parents.
55. See Mnookin, supra note 31, at 254; see also Benson v. Benson, 495 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1993); HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 798 (2d ed. 1987) ("[Clustody cases are largely won or
lost in the trial court."); Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REv. 405, 443-44
(1988).
56. See. e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rulesfor Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 477 (1984) (acknowledging the value of discretion but rejecting the formulation of the "best interests" standard); Jon
Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987) (rejecting the
indeterminacy of "best interests" given limitations on judicial capabilities in favor of automatic rules like determinative
alternative); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60
TILANEL. REV. 1365 (1986) (supporting adoption of an automatic rule rather than the "best interests" test); Mnookin,
supra note 31 (criticizing the indeterminacy of a highly discretionary system while discussing the difficulties of adopting
any rule-based system); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA "s Best Interest
Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1991) (emphasizing the value of judicial discretion in child custody cases while
proposing some limitations on it); see also Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule, Child Custody and the
Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168 (1984) (arguing in support of the primary caretaker test partly because
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On a more concrete level, there is disagreement about how to assess the importance of
particular parental conduct or characteristics. Recent controversies have included whether
smoking cigarettes, 5 7 drug abuse, or spousal or child abuse should affect the issue of
custody. 5 Assessment of the appropriate weight and meaning to be given to a parent's
sexuality or sexual practices-including homosexual and heterosexual nonmarital sex-in
a custody case has been a recurrent and high-profile problem.
Most commentators have identified two basic approaches to considering parental
sexuality or sexual conduct in a custody case, sometimes terming them the nexus test and
the per se rule. 9 Under a nexus test, questions about fitness, parenting, and the
significance of specific characteristics or conduct are considered on an individual case-
by-case basis. In each case the trial court is required to assess the relative merits of the
two parents. The court must determine whether the particular characteristic or conduct
makes the parent a less desirable custodial parent. Given the universal acceptance of the
best interests of the child as the goal of custody jurisprudence, this question is typically
resolved by examining whether the parent's sexuality or sexual conduct has an adverse
impact on the child.10 If it has no adverse impact, then it is not pertinent to determining
the best interests of the child and is irrelevant in a custody contest. This approach is
denominated a nexus test because it turns on the court finding a nexus between the
characteristic or conduct at issue and the parenting abilities of the mother or father.
One alternative to applying a nexus test is a per se rule. Under a per se rule, all parents
falling into a particular category-for example, all lesbian or gay parents, or more
broadly, all parents cohabiting with another adult to whom they are not married-are
necessarily considered unfit or undesirable. They are unfit or undesirable precisely
because of their membership in the disadvantaged category. Therefore, any parent who
is lesbian or gay or who is cohabiting is automatically disqualified in a custody contest.
of its constraint of discretion).
57. See, e.g., Division of Family Servs. v. Ellis, 870 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming restrictions on
grandmother's visitation based on smoking); Unger v. Unger, 644 A.2d 691 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (affirming
the relevance of cigarette smoking in custody disputes); see also Jeffrey L. Hall, Secondhand Smoke as an Issue in Child
Custody Visitation Disputes, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 115 (1994); Victoria L. Wendling, Note, Smoking and Parenting: Can
They Be AdjudgedMutually Exclusive Activities, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1025 (1992).
58. A number of states have enacted statutes mandating a presumption that evidence of domestic violence is relevant
in child custody hearings. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(bX2) (West Supp. 1995) (mandating a rebuttable presumption
where there is evidence of a parent's conviction for domestic violence); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West Supp. 1995);
Micti. CONs. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1995-96); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(11) (Vernon Supp. 1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2() (1991).
59. In addition to these two main categories, most commentators identify one or occasionally two other categories.
See, e.g., Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent. 22 FAm. L. Q. 71 (1988)
(identifying a third category of rebuttable presumption); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1508, 1630-32 (1989) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (identifying a third category where
homosexuality occasions the need to place limits on any custody award); Maria W. Evans, Parent and Child MJ.P. v.
J.G.P- .Anr Analysis of the Relevance of Parental Hom osexuality in Child Custody Determinations, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 633,
641-42 (1982); Katz, stpra note 55, at 447.48 (identifying four categories, including rebuttable presumption). In general,
I disagree with the use of the additional categories. In my view, the irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions are both
versions of a per se rule. In either case, the lesbian or gay parent is automatically and always disadvantaged without any
individualized analysis. Whether absolute disqualification or substantial disadvantage results from that initial assumption
seems to me less crucial. Indeed, most of the commentators who adopt this division of the cases note that the rebuttable
presumption appears to be rebuttable only in theory. See also Amicus Brief for American Ass'n of Matrimonial Lawyers
at 2-3 & n.3, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (No. 941166) (identifying a third category as one involving
cases imposing restrictions on parental activities).
60. Under a case-by-case analysis, many different approaches are possible. For example, instead of determining
whether the parental conduct is harmful to the child, the court could determine whether, without regard to impact on the
child, the parental conduct warrants some sanction. It could then determine that the appropriate sanction might be to deny
or restrict that parent's custody of the child. Under this analysis, the restrictions might or might not be in the child's best
interests.
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Once a parent's membership in the undesirable category is determined, no further
examination of the case's specific facts relating to that parent is required. The two parents
are not compared. The particular characteristics or conduct of the other parent and the
other parent's relationship to the child are only relevant if they demonstrate that the other
parent is also unfit.6' A true per se rule requires that all lesbian and gay parents, for
example, must lose custody. It divests a trial court of all discretion to grant custody to any
lesbian, gay, or nonmarital sexually active parent.
True per se rules arise when an appellate court reverses a grant of custody to, for
example, a lesbian mother, despite the fact that the trial court has rendered a considered
decision awarding her custody. When an appellate court takes this step, it effectively
announces that a lesbian mother cannot be awarded custody of her child, even if the trial
court believes it to be appropriate in a particular case. Despite the discretion generally
granted trial courts in custody matters, only one decision will be affirmed on appeal-a
denial of custody.
In fact, reported instances of true per se rules are quite rare. 61 Most of the opinions
generally cited as adopting some form of a per se rule do not formally constrain the
discretion of trial judges to find in favor of the lesbian or gay parent, should a judge
choose to do so. Instead, most of the opinions grant the trial courts unbridled discretion
to deny custody whenever they choose but also, potentially, to award custody if it is
deemed appropriate.
Cases in which judges are given unbridled discretion appear in a procedural context
significantly different from the true per se rule cases-appellate review of trial court
denials of custody to a lesbian, gay, or cohabiting parent. An appellate affirmance of a
denial of custody establishes that the trial court has reasonably found facts or has drawn
a permissible and properly supported inference and has reached an acceptable conclusion,
but the appellate court does not necessarily determine that the trial court's decision is the
only permissible inference or the only acceptable conclusion.
In many of these instances, however, the original denials of custody are not based on
any evidence of harm to the child. Affirmance in such a case establishes that a court may
permissibly infer harm from the mere fact that a parent is lesbian or gay and base a
determination on that inference, but it does not necessarily require that a court draw that
inference. Therefore, these opinions do not dictate that all lesbian mothers must lose
custody in all cases, but the opinions clearly make this result possible and even desirable.
It is critical to recognize the existence of a third approach, apart from the nexus test
and the per se rule. This standard permits, but does not require, a trial court to infer harm
to a child in the absence of any evidence of harm. Further, the permissible inference is
one that, standing alone, can justify the court's decision to deny custody. Thus, it is a
permissible determinative inference, and I will label this approach accordingly.
While permissible determinative inference cases are extremely problematic and possess
some obvious similarities to per se cases, they also differ significantly.63 Therefore, to
categorize them as per se cases is to miss a crucial distinction. Per se cases completely
61. A finding that the second parent is unfit does not rehabilitate the first parent. It also does not return the parents
to equal footing or permit the court to take other factors into consideration. It simply means that the child will not be placed
in the custody of either parent, and in all likelihood the child will be placed in the custody of another relative or in foster
core.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 74-90.
63. The rhetorical devices employed in per se cases and permissible determinative inference cases are frequently
similar, as are the underlying concerns which appear to motivate the courts.
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constrain the discretion of trial courts. They embody rule-bound decisionmaking.
Permissible determinative inference cases represent the opposite extreme. They invest a
trial court with absolute and unreviewable discretion, for an inference is permitted even
in the absence of supporting evidence: A court's decision to draw (or in theory not to
draw) the inference can never be deemed incorrect on appeal."
Although distinct from a per se rule, the deleterious effect of the permissible
determinative inference approach should not be understated. It allows lower courts to
adopt and to utilize their own per se rules. Further, the rhetoric that generally
accompanies adoption of this approach encourages such action. Like a per se rule, this
approach rests on a combination of inaccurate stereotypical images of lesbians, gay men,
and cohabiting heterosexuals, unsupported and insupportable assumptions about the
capacity of nonconforming individuals to raise children, and judicial and societal
prejudice and bias. Ultimately, the permissible determinative inference approach
constitutes an evasion of responsibility on the part of appellate courts which results in the
subversion of the best interests of the child in custody cases.65
In the next Sections, I will examine the nexus test, the per se rule, and the permissible
determinative inference approach in more detail. I focus on these analyses because they
are the dominant alternatives in analyzing these types of characteristics and conduct." An
examination of selected cases typifying each approach will illuminate the challenges that
currently confront lesbian and gay parents.
A. The Nexus Test
Courts in a majority of the jurisdictions that have considered within the last twenty
years a parent's homosexuality in assessing an individual's fitness as a parent have
expressed approval of the basic principles of the nexus test. 67 A nexus test requires that
64. For a critique of trial court discretion overall, see Schneider, supra note 56, at 2249-52.
65. Just as the permissible determinative inference approach has features in common with a per se rule, so it bears
some resemblance to (and hence may be confused with) a nexus test. Both rest on a finding of harn to the particular child.
(This distinguishes the permissible determinative inference approach and the nexus test from the per se rule, which rests
on a finding of harm to all children of parents in a particular category.) However, the nexus test at least theoretically
requires a specific evidentiary basis for the finding of harm, while the inference approach permits the finding without any
evidentiary support. When the nexus test is not scrupulously applied it may become little more than a version of the
permissible determinative inference approach. See inra text accompanying notes 108-30.
66. One can readily imagine other variations on these approaches. For example, a court could decide that a lesbian
parent is not automatically disqualified, but instead must overcome a presumption against an award of custody to her. Such
an analysis bears close resemblance to the per se rule in that all lesbian mothers are automatically disadvantaged, although
not as severely as with the per se rule. As is discussed above, some commentators consider this to be a separate approach,
but I think it is more useful to conceptualize this as a minor variation on an existing theme.
67. Courts in 27 states have done so. They are Alabama, H.J.B. v. P.W., 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993);
Alaska, S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985); Arizona, In re Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action
B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); California, In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App.
1988); Connecticut, Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1988); Delaware, Gerald & Margaret D. v. Peggy
R., No. 79-12-143-CV (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 17, 1980); Florida, Seebol v. Farie, 17 Fano. L. Rep. (BNA) 1331 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 15, 1991), Davis v. Davis, 335 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Illinois, In re Marriage of Williams, 563
N.E.2d 1195 (11. App. Ct. 1990); Indiana, D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Iowa, In re Marriage of
Wiarda, 505N.W.2d 506 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993), Hodson v. Moore, 464 NYV.2d 699 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); Kentucky, S.
v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Maine, Whitehead v. Black, 2 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2593 (Me. June 14,1976); Massachusetts, Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), Bezio v. Patenaude,
410 N.E2d 1207, 1215-16 (Mass. 1980); Michigan, People v. Brown, 212 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Missouri,
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.E.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); New Jersey, M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979); New Mexico, A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), State er rel. Human Serv. Dep't (In re Jacinta
M.), 764 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); New York, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1986),
Guinan v. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (App. Div. 1984); North Dakota, Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981);
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some connection or nexus between an individual parent's homosexuality and harm to the
particular child in question be established before the parent's homosexuality is
considered relevant to the custody determination. Application of a nexus test to the
question of a parent's homosexuality is consistent with the general family law principle
that most parental characteristics are relevant only if they can be shown to have an impact
on the child.
As with most traditional custody tests, a nexus test entrusts the determination of the
proper custody arrangement in a particular case to the informed and reasoned judgment
of the trial court. The test mandates an individualized determination of child custody for
each case and does not dictate any particular result in all cases. This is the strength of the
test as well as its weakness. If the nexus test is given appropriate content, if it is
scrupulously applied, and if appellate courts carefully review its application, it can assist
courts in determining the best interests of the child.68
A recent example of the nexus test is Van Driel v. Van Driel.69 In Van Driel, Lori and
James Van Driel originally agreed to joint legal and physical custody of their two
children. Shortly after the divorce became final, James petitioned for a modification of
custody, based on his fear that the children would be ridiculed by their peers and would
react negatively in the future to their mother's sexual orientation. Despite James' motion,
the trial court awarded physical custody to Lori. This determination was affirmed on
appeal.
70
Ohio, Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Oklahoma, Fox v. Fox, Nos. 79676, 83590, 1995 WL
422057 (Okla. July 18, 1995); Oregon, In re Marriage of Ashling, 599 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); South Carolina,
Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Tennessee, In re Parsons, No. 02A01-9403-JV-00037, 1995
WL 442587 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 1995), Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-11, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 (Mar. 30,
1988); Utah, Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980); Vermont, Nickerson v. Nickerson, 605 A.2d 1331 (Vt. 1992);
Washington, In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash.
1978). In addition, the District of Columbia has a statute mandating that custody shall be determined without reference
to sexual orientation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (a)(5) (1981).
I do not mean to suggest that all of these jurisdictions have clearly adopted a nexus test. For example, I have included
Collins, a Tennessee appellate decision which makes no explicit mention of the nexus test but seems to follow its basic
principles.
68. The nexus test is frequently employed in cases involving heterosexually active but unmarried parents. See, e.g.,
Pea v. Pea, 498 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Robinson v. Robinson, 615 A.2d 1190 (Md. 1992); Bouchard v.
Bouchard, 422 N.E.2d 471 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Feldman v. Feldman, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507 (App. Div. 1974); it re Rex,
444 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d 1375 (Okla. 1984).
69. 525 N.W.2d 37 (S.D. 1994).
70. It is intriguing to contrast VN Driel with an earlier South Dakota Supreme Court opinion, authored by the same
Chief Justice, Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992). In Chicoine the supreme court found that a trial court
abused its discretion when it permitted unsupervised visitation with the lesbian mother on alternate weekends, even though
visitation was allowed only on the condition that no unrelated women and no gay men be present during visitation. The
court recited many failings of the lesbian mother in Chicoine, among them that she had experienced psychological
problems "including ... active homosexual relationships with several female partners," that she "openly admits that she
is an active homosexual and that she had many sexual encounters with female partners during [her] marriage," that she
and the children moved out of her marital home and into her lover's home, that she and her lover were "affectionate
towards each other in front of the children, caressing, kissing and saying 'I love you,"' and that she and her lover discussed
getting married. Id. at 893-94. In contrast, the lesbian mother in Van Driel was "discreet about the sexual aspects of their
... relationship." Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d at 39. Although the lesbian couple in Van Driel had "exchanged vows," this
seemed to count in their favor. Not surprisingly, the father in Van Driel relied heavily on Chicoine, but the court quickly
dismissed his reliance, stating that the facts are "so wholly dissimilar as to render Chicoine irrelevant." Id.
Chicoine and Van Driel exemplify the law's good lesbian/bad lesbian dichotomy. The mother in Van Driel is a good
lesbian-discreet, monogamous, apparently a homebody-and is therefore worthy to receive custody. By contrast, the
mother in Chicoine, who is portrayed as a highly sexual figure, is a bad lesbian and even liberal visitation with her children
is suspect. This division of lesbians into favored and disfavored categories and its consequences for the lesbian community
have been observed and criticized by theorists. See. e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUr)LAw 132-34 (1992); Ruthann
Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbiats in Legal Theory, 19 SIGNS 975, 989 (1994).
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The South Dakota Supreme Court rejected James' argument that a per se rule should
apply. It held that assertedly immoral conduct "must be shown to have had some harmful
effect on the children." 7' Finding that there was no evidence that classmates or the larger
community ridiculed the children or that the mother's living arrangments adversely
affected the children, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.72
B. The Per Se Rule
In its simplest form, a per se rule dictates that any parents in a particular category will
not get custody. Such a rule is consistent with the best interests of the child only if it is
assumed that all parents in that category necessarily damage or harm their children. Once
that is assumed, it follows that it is always in the best interests of a child to be removed
from the custody of that parent.73
This is essentially the reasoning utilized by courts that have adopted a per se rule
denying lesbian and gay parents custody. These courts make a finding-explicitly or
implicitly-that it is never in the interests of any child to be in the custody of a lesbian
or gay parent, at least where there is a minimally adequate heterosexual parent (or
sometimes, heterosexual relative) available as an alternative.74 Analogous reasoning has
been used to advance a maternal preference" or a preference for the primary caretaker76
as consistent with the best interests of the child. This reasoning has also been used to
advance a per se rule disqualifying parents who have physically abused members of their
families.
The principle example of a per se rule as to lesbian and gay parents is Roe v. Roe.77 In
Roe, the child in question had resided with her father for over six years, beginning at a
time when the mother was too ill to care for the child. The father was gay and lived with
71. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d at 39.
72. Other opinions carefully applying a nexus test include: S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) and M.P.
v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1979); see also Fox v. Fox, Nos. 79676,83590, 1995 WL 422057 (Olda.
July 18, 1995) (reversing the change of custody to husband and away from the lesbian mother because there was no
evidence that her behavior adversely affected the children).
73. It does not necessarily follow from the application of the per se rule that it is in the best interests of the child to
be placed with the parent who is not lesbian or gay. For various reasons, this individual might also be an inappropriate
custodian. In such a case, the child might be placed in foster care or with another relative.
A per se rule may be justified by reference to goals other than the best interests of the child. For example, the use of
a per se rule may be justified as a sanction for violation of adultery, sodomy, or fornication statutes. This approach has
been much less useful since the advent of no-fault divorce. And, of course, both the sanction approach and the best
interests approach can work together, particularly where the conduct in question is criminal.
74. For example, the trial court in Nadler v. Nadler, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App. 1967), expressly found that the
homosexuality of the mother "as a matter of law constitutes her not a fit or proper person" to have custody of her child.
Id at 353. The appellate court reversed the trial court, noting it had failed to exercise discretion and to determine the best
interests of the child.
75. A maternal preference, sometimes called a "tender years" presumption, favors a child's mother over its father.
It is based on the premise that it is in the best interests of children to live with their mothers. Though the constitutionality
ofa maternal preference has been called into question on Equal Protection grounds, it is still in limited use in a number
of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Gill, 413 S.E.2d 860, 864 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the tender years
presumption is tie-breaker in the case of equally qualified parents); Malone v. Malone, 842 S.W.2d 621,623 (renn. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that the court must give consideration to the tender years presumption although the controlling inquiry
is best interests of the child). In addition, without regard to its lack of formal adoption, many believe that the preference
is alive and well and frequently used by judges.
76. See Neely, supra note 56, at 169; see also Lewis v. Lewis, 433 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1993).
77. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). Roe was generally reaffirmed in Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995),
though Bottoms may not be a true per se case since the supreme court reinstated the trial court's original ruling denying
the lesbian mother custody. In addition, some Missouri appellate decisions are sometimes read as establishing a per se rule,
although closer consideration shows they are technically permissible determinative inference cases. See infra note 118.
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his lover. Despite this, the trial court found that each parent had been "a fit, devoted, and
competent custodian. '78 The court also found that the child was happy, with "no evidence
that the father's conduct had an adverse effect on the child. ' 79 Based on this record, the
trial court awarded joint legal custody to both parents and ordered that the child live with
the father during the school year and the mother during summer vacation, with extensive
visitation to both parents. The trial court was not, however, without anxiety over the
father's homosexuality. It conditioned the father's custody upon his "not sharing the
same bed or bedroom with any male lover or friend while the child is present in the
home."8 While the trial court was concerned about potential problems that might arise
as the child reached adolescence, it concluded that these problems could be dealt with
"when and if they arose."'"
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order. It determined that
The father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship
renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law .... [W]e have no
hesitancy in saying that the conditions under which this child must live daily are not
only unlawful but also impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social
condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably afflict her relationships with her
peers and with the community at large....
.. The impact of such behavior upon the child, and upon any of her peers who may
visit the home, is inevitable. 2
Based on its finding of inevitable harm to the child, the court ordered custody with the
mother and restricted visitation to prohibit visits in the father's home or in the presence
of his lover "while his present living arrangements continue[d]." 3 The court held that "an
award of custody to such a parent [who carries on an active homosexual relationship in
the same residence as the child] constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion." 4
By design, a per se rule applies to all parents who fall into a particular disadvantaged
category. Most commonly, a court or a particular judge imposes a per se rule on all those
who identify themselves publicly as lesbian or gay or on all those who have same-sex
lovers, date others of the same sex, or engage in other specified conduct. 5 Typically
public identity and conduct are of greater concern to the court than private or "discreet"
conduct, since it is public identification as a lesbian or gay man that triggers the most
prevalent concerns.86
The use of per se rules in custody cases is increasingly unpopular. Per se rules have
been frequently, and apparently uniformly, criticized by commentators.17 Many have
assailed the rule's critical assumption that lesbian and gay parents invariably harm their
children. There is a substantial and mounting body of social science literature that
78. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 692.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 693.
82. Id. at 694.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 691. While Roe is an example of a court-adopted per se rule, a legislature could also adopt a per se rule.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985) (prohibiting adoption by lesbians and gay men); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 170-B:4 (1994) (prohibiting adoption by a homosexual).
85. For example, the rule in Roe appears to apply to all parents who "carry on" an active homosexual relationship
in the house where the child resides. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 691; see also Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I1, 1988 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 123 at *5 (Mar. 30, 1988) (Tomlin, J., concurring).
86. See hifra text accompanying notes 142-5 I.
87. See Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 1636-42; David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial
Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 345 (1994); Pershing, supra note 49, at 291-308.
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demonstrates otherwise and no literature to support the assumption." In addition, the
constitutionality of a per se rule is suspect.89 Moreover, cultural and societal attitudes
toward nonmarital sex and toward lesbians and gay men have shifted over the past
twenty-five years, with large sectors of the public expressing increased tolerance.
For whatever reason, courts seem to be moving away from per se rules disqualifying
lesbian and gay parents. Courts in jurisdictions that have previously applied per se
rules-or at least rules that are identified as per se rules-are reinterpreting cases to
narrow or revise these interpretations, not only as applied to lesbians and gay men but
also to nonmarried sexually active parents.90
C. The Permissible Determinative Inference
Most commentators have settled on two categories-the nexus test and the per se rule.
Nonetheless, some of the cases generally cited as examples of a per se rule are actually
not that at all. Rather than require that all lesbian, gay, or unmarried but sexually active
heterosexual parents lose custody, the cases permit this result without mandating it.
For example, Thigpen v. Carpenter9 is sometimes identified as a case establishing a
per se rule. Closer examination, however, reveals that this interpretation of the case is not
necessarily correct. In Thigpen, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found there was no need
for evidence that a lesbian mother's residing with her lover had a detrimental impact on
her children. "[I]t has never been necessary to prove that illicit sexual conduct on the part
of the custodial parent is detrimental to the children. Arkansas courts have presumed that
it is." '92 As a consequence of this presumed impact, the court found that a change of
custody 93-from joint custody to paternal custody-was appropriate.94
One can fully understand the precedential significance of Thigpen only by examining
its procedural context. The trial court in Thigpen modified the existing custody
arrangement to restrict the rights of the lesbian mother. Technically, the issue on appeal
88. See infra part IV.A.
89. Either Equal Protection or procedural Due Process might form the basis for a constitutional attack. The possible
equal protection analysis has been developed in several law review articles. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note
59, at 1640-42; Pershing, supra note 49, at 308-11; Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal
Protection Analysis, 102 HARv. L. REV. 617 (1989).
A procedural due process argument would flow from Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the United
States Supreme Court found that an Illinois presumption that an unwed father was an unfit father violated the Due Process
Clause. The statute was invoked upon the death of a mother to defeat the custody claims of the father. As a consequence,
the children were declared wards of the state. The Supreme Court reasoned that Stanley had a protected interest in his
relationship with his children and that he could not be deprived of this interest without a hearing on his fitness as a parent.
Stanley would most directly apply to a per se rule mandating termination of parental rights for particular sexual conduct
or identity. Its application to custody cases depends on recognition of a protected liberty interest in a parent's custodial
relationship with a child.
90. See hfra note 107.
91. 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
92. Id at 513. The court was particularly concerned because the mother and her lover shared a bedroom while the
children were visiting. There was no evidence that the mother had ever engaged in sexual conduct in the children's
presence, and the court aecepted that neither she nor her lover intended to do so. Id.
93. Thigpen is a modification case rather than an original custody case. Thus, the father (at least in theory) faced a
more difficult task convincing a court to change custody than he would have persuading a court to grant him initial
custody. If the presumption against a lesbian mother is strong enough to overcome a court's reluctance to change custody,
it must also be strong enough to defeat the mother's initial claim for custody.
94. As is frequently the case, the appellate court hastened to add that the lesbian relationship was not the trial judge's
sole justification for the change of custody. Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 513. The other factors discussed by the chancellor
included the mother's enrollment in graduate school, the father's intent to remain in the same neighborhood where the
children previously lived, the possibility that the children would be subjected to ridicule because of the mother's lesbian
relationship, and the fact that the mother's conduct was contrary to the court's sense of morality.
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was not whether custody should be changed, but rather whether the trial court was within
its discretion in ordering that custody be changed. Given the deference shown to trial
courts in custody matters, the affirmance of the trial court's decision can be understood
to convey nothing other than that denying custody to a lesbian mother is permissible, but
not mandatory.95
Viewed in this light, Thigpen may still be extremely problematic, but for different
reasons than a per se rule. Thigpen stands for the proposition that a trial court may deny
custody to a nonconforming parent at will, in the absence of any evidence, and that such
a decision will not be disturbed on appeal. It lodges absolute and unreviewable discretion
in the trial court to deny custody to certain parents as it sees fit. Consequently, trial
courts, like the one in Thigpen, may systematically deny custody to lesbian and gay
parents, but may also may award custody to a lesbian mother.
Unmarried heterosexual couples have encountered similar arbitrary rules. In Jarrett v.
Jarrett," the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated a trial court decision shifting custody9 of
three children from their mother to their father." The father acknowledged that his
daughters, who were twelve, ten, and seven at the time of the divorce, were "clean,
healthy, well dressed and well nourished when he picked them up."" There was no
evidence of harm to the children or defect in the mother's conduct or character, with one
crucial exception: Jacqueline Jarrett chose to live with Wayne Hammon without being
married to him.' 0 The father felt that this "was not a proper [environment] in which to
raise three young girls."''
On this basis alone, the trial court found that "it was 'necessary for the moral and
spiritual well-being and development' of the children" that custody of the children be
switched to the father. 2 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld this ruling. The court found
that the state fornication statute, which criminalized cohabitation or sexual intercourse
95. Other cases that might be interpreted to establish a permissible determinative presumption in the context of
lesbian and gay parents include: In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281 (11. App. Ct. 1991); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Mohrman v. Mohrman, 565 N.E.2d 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that the trial court was not required to find that the mother's lesbian relationship had an adverse impact in order to award
custody to the other parent). These cases are in contrast to the rule adopted in Roe. In Roe, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed a trial court's award of custody to a gay father. Given the procedural setting, Roe can only be understood to
establish a rule denying trial courts the discretion to award custody to gay parents in similar cases. Thus, the rule dictates
the specific result in each case.
96. 400 N.E.2d 421 (11. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
97. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act governing modification of custody judgment was enacted during the
pendency of the case. The supreme court noted that the new statute simply codified prior decisional law. Id. at 423. The
statute provided that a court was obliged to continue custody unless "the child's present environment endangers seriously
his physical, mental, moral or emotional health andthe harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed
by its advantages to him." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 610(bX3) (1977) (emphasis added). In addition, the statute directed
the court to disregard any "conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child."
Id. para. 602(b).
98. See also Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the best interest of a child would be
served by changing custody from mother to father because mother was living in open concubinage).
99. Jarret, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
100. Jacqueline Jarrett did not wish to many because it was too soon after her divorce. She had spoken to her children
about her living arrangements. She "explained to the children that some people thought it was wrong for an unmarried man
and woman to live together but she thought that what mattered was that they loved each other." Id. The Illinois Court of
Appeals found this candor to be a positive attribute. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 382 N.E.2d 12, 16 (11. App. Ct. 1978), rev 'd, 400
N.E.2d 421 (111. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980). For the Illinois Supreme Court, however, it demonstrated that
her conduct was open and notorious and, hence, in violation of law. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
101. Id. at 422.
102. Id. (quoting the trial court).
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"if the behavior [was] open and notorious,"'0 3 established the relevant standard of
conduct.14 Since the mother's conduct was illegal, it was presumed to be immoral. The
court concluded that "the moral values which Jacqueline currently represents to her
children, and those which she may be expected to portray to them in the future,
contravene statutorily declared standards of conduct and endanger the children's moral
development. " "5 No actual evidence of injury to the children's moral well-being was
required. The change of custody was justifiable as a measure to safeguard the children
against the possibility of harm.'0 6
Jarrett allows a trial court to adopt the premise that all cohabiting mothers (or perhaps
cohabiting parents) will cause their children harm. For that reason, no specific inquiry
into the well-being of the children is necessary. Properly interpreted, Jarrett suggests that
a trial court could bar all parents who violate the fornication statute from obtaining
custody, at least of young girls, without regard to the specifics of the particular case.
Thus, in Jarrett, the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted a permissible determinative
inference standard.'
0 7
Appellate courts may be drawn to the permissible determinative inference standard for
purely pragmatic reasons. The standard allows them to deny custody to lesbian and gay
parents without adopting the potentially problematic per se rule. In a case where the trial
court has already denied custody or restricted visitation, there is no need for a per se rule.
III. MISAPPLICATION AND DISTORTION OF THE NEXUS TEST
Over the past fifteen years, appellate courts in a number of states have reviewed many
custody cases involving lesbian or gay parents. Very few have adopted a per se rule.
Several have approved a permissible determinative inference standard. A far greater
number have expressed approval for a nexus test.0 0 This trend in favor of the nexus test
would seem to be a success story for advocates of lesbian and gay rights, heralding the
advent of a world where lesbian and gay parents are not disadvantaged in court.
Yet lesbian and gay parents are still denied custody and visitation simply because they
are lesbians and gay men. Appellate court endorsement of the principles of the nexus test
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-8 (1977). The fornication statute has since been amended and the code
reorganized. Illinois' current fornication statute is found at 720 ILCS 5/11-8 (1993). Cohabitation is no longer illegal, but
sexual intercourse outside of marriage remains a crime if the behavior is open and notorious. Id.
104. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d at 423-24.
105. Id at 425.
106. Id While discussing the children's moral well-being at great lengths, the court also expressed its concern for
the children's mental and emotional health. Id at 425-26. Among the causes for concern, the court noted that Wayne
Hammon played with the Jarrett children and their friends in the Jarrett home. The children might be required to explain
who Wayne is, which in turn might expose them to taunts and jibes.
107. The Supreme Court of Illinois has specifically declined to interpret Jarrelt as establishing a per se rule. In In re
Marriage of Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88 (Ill.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983), the court affirmed an award of custody
to a parent who had cohabited with a lover of the opposite sex. The court stated that "[tlheJarrett case does not establish
a conclusive presumption that, because a custodial parent cohabits with a member of the opposite sex, the child is harmed.
No such presumption exists in this State." Id. at 93. Even before Thompson, some appellate courts had refused to read
Jarrett as establishing a per se rule, instead confining it to its facts. See, e.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 425 N.E.2d 1251 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1981) (affirming denial of motion to transfer custody from mother who lived openly with married man); In re Marriage
of Olson, 424 N.E.2d 386 (11. App. Ct. 1981) (affirming denial of motion to transfer custody from mother involved in
sexual relationship with another man); see also Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1977) (affirming grant of custody
to father under facts similar toJarreu). As with Jarrett, the Virginia courts have explicitly denied that Brown establishes
a per se rule. See Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415, 417 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617, 618
(Va. CL App. 1992).
108. See cases cited supra note 67.
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has not ensured them fair treatment.0 9 The problems facing lesbian and gay parents are
more serious than reading recent opinions suggests: due to their often accurate perception
that courts may be hostile to them, lesbian and gay parents are disadvantaged in private
resolution of custody disputes and are less able to adopt strong bargaining positions."'
Examination of recent opinions reveal several significant factors which have
contributed and combined to produce these results. Viewed carefully, the tests being used
in many jurisdictions are called nexus tests, but they lack the substance of a nexus test.
Three factors seem to be of particular importance. First, many courts engage in or
permit speculation about potential future harm, rather than confining the inquiry to
proven harm or even harm which is reasonably likely to occur. This dilutes the essential
ingredient of a nexus test-the requirement that the parent's conduct cause harm."'
Second, appellate opinions have not clearly defined and limited what counts as "harm"
under the nexus test. This leaves trial judges and the appellate courts free to identify
wide-ranging and ill-defined harms, including stigma and moral injury, without engaging
in any careful analysis. By invoking such harms and indulging in unsupported
speculation about their likely occurrence, courts can freely deny custody to lesbian and
gay parents while claiming to employ a nexus test. A trial court that is free to speculate
about an indeterminate range of possible harms that might (or might not) result at an
unspecified time in the future is essentially free to disqualify a lesbian or gay parent at
will, based on little or no specific evidence. These problems are exacerbated by a third
factor, one common to most family law cases: appellate courts are extremely deferential
to trial courts and hence affirm rulings on any ground possible. The following Sections
will examine each of these factors.
A. Speculation About Occurrence of Harm
The nexus test requires that the parental characteristic or conduct in question be linked
to a detrimental impact on the child." 2 Yet in many opinions which purport to adopt a
nexus test, courts speculate about possible harm to the child at some time in the future." 3
Judicial speculation undermines the critical requirement of the nexus test. If a judge is
permitted to freely speculate about possible harm, she or he can avoid the requirement
that a link between conduct and harm be demonstrated.
109. See ROBSON, supra note 70, at 131.
110. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korohauser, Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Neely, supra note 56, at 177-79.
One indication of legal hostility's effect on private ordering may be the frequency with which lesbian mothers initially
agree to eitherjoint custody or father custody rather than seeking sole custody. See. e.g., Johnson v. Schlotman, 502
N.W.2d 831,832 (N.D. 1993) (involving a mother who originally agreed to joint legal custody, with physical custody of
children to the father). In addition, lesbian and gay parents, probably motivated by fear of the court's reaction, sometimes
conceal their sexual identities during custody proceedings, only to face an even more hostile court on a motion for
modification. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the trial judge was
unaware that mother was a lesbian at time of initial decision).
111. For a critique of a similar tendency to exaggerate the possible risk to children in the context of child protection
proceedings, see Mnookin, supra note 3 1, at 277-81.
112. See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) ("Consideration of a parent's conduct is appropriate only
when the evidence supports a finding that a parent's conduct has or reasonably will have an adverse impact on the child
and his best interests."); see also Pea v. Pea, 498 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to speculate about the
possible harm caused by the mother's cohabitation with a man).
113. In addition to the cases discussed in the text and notes that follow, see Collins v. Collins, No. 87-288-I1, 1988
Tenn. App. LEXIS 123, at *4 (Mar. 30, 1988).
The problems ofjudicial speculation are rampant in child custody litigation since the best interests standard essentially
requires a court to speculate about the future well-being of the individual child. See Mnookin, supra note 31, at 251-52.
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For example, in S.E.G. v. R.A.G., the Missouri Court of Appeals appeared to endorse
and to apply a nexus test." 4 Yet, ultimately, the court denied a lesbian mother's request
for custody without any evidence of harm to the child."5 The court noted that it "wish[ed]
to protect the children from peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing they may
encounter."" 6 The court concluded the opinion by stating that it "[would] not ignore...
conduct ... which may have an effect on the children's moral development."' 7 The court
did not find that the children had been harmed in any way. In the end, no nexus between
the mother's sexual orientation and harm to the child was proven, and none was required.
Whatever the court's intentions, it did not apply a nexus test."'
Similarly, in S. v. S.," 9 the Kentucky Court of Appeals specifically declined to
determine whether a lesbian relationship alone warranted a change of custody. Instead,
the court examined only the case before it. This approach is consistent with the nexus
test. Still, the court found an adequate basis to reverse the trial court and change custody
to the father. The testimony of a court-appointed psychologist was critical to the
reviewing court. The psychologist stated:
Without question, in my opinion, there is social stigma attached to homosexuality.
Therefore Shannon will have additional burdens to bear in terms of teasing, possible
embarrassment and internal conflicts. Also, there is excellent scientific research on the
effects of parental modeling on children. Speculating from such data, it is reasonable
to suggest that Shannon may have difficulties in achieving a fulfilling heterosexual
identity of her own in the future. 20
By contrast, the expert for the lesbian mother predicated his testimony on current
conditions and found no harm to the child. Lacking any evidence of harm to the child or
even a firm prediction of future harm, the appellate court nonetheless reversed the trial
114. 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). The court stated that "[t]here must be a nexus between harm to the child
and the parent's homosexuality." Id. at 166. At the same time, otherportions of the language in S.E.G. strongly suggest
the adoption of a per se rule.
115. It is probably not sensible to insist that a court wait until actual harm to the child has occurred. Yet there is cause
for concern regarding unbridled judicial discretion. It seems that in addition to actual harm, courts should be able to rely
upon evidence that a specific situation makes specific harm to the child likely-not just possible. Courts should not,
however, be free to speculate about mere possibilities of harm to a child. See i/fra text accompanying notes 266-69.
116. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 166 (emphasis added).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. In the end, the opinion could be read to establish a per se rule. After reviewing the evidence of the mother's
conduct (which included sleeping in the same bed as her lover and showing affection toward her in the presence of the
children), tie court concluded that "[s]uch conduct can never be kept private enough to be a neutral factor in the
development of a child's values and character." Id. at 166. This blanket condemnation obviously resembles a per se rule,
leaving proper categorization of the case difficult. Judge Lowenstein went on to state that he would choose to recast the
presumption as a rebuttable one. See GA. v. DA., 745 S.W.2d 726,728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (Lowenstein, J., dissenting)
(observing that "there would appear to be ajudicial policy in this state to conclusively presume the detrimental impact on
a child from the parent's homosexuality"); see also J.L.P. v. DJ.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (restricting gay
father's visitation); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding custody award to heterosexual father rather
than lesbian mother); NX.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding change of custody from lesbian
mother to heterosexual father, ostensibly under the nexus test).
119.608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
120. Id. at 66 (emphases added). There is, in fact, no research to support the witness' speculation that the child of a
lesbian mother may have difficulty achieving a heterosexual identity. Speculation that a child may grow up to be lesbian
or gay is, however, a frequent concern of courts. See cases cited infra note 157.
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court and found that a change of custody was warranted.' Ultimately, the test applied
by the Kentucky court does not require any meaningful nexus at all.
2
S. v. S. also highlights a general problem with the court's concerns about stigma. In
many cases, courts express concern about harm caused by the stigmatization of children
of nonconforming parents, or alternatively, consider stigma in and of itself to constitute
harm.'2 Yet not a single one of these decisions actually relies on evidence that a
particular child has been harmed, and only one case includes any evidence of actual
stigmatization. 124 Thus, decisions based on stigmatization almost always rest on
inappropriate judicial speculation.
B. Uncertainty Regarding What Constitutes Harm
Courts that have appeared to adopt a nexus test have not generally defined or limited
what constitutes harm to the child. Judges are able to construct their own notions of what
constitutes harm. Given a sufficiently flexible and expansive definition of harm,
determinations against lesbian and gay parents can generally be justified as ostensibly
consistent with a nexus test.
For example, many courts express concern that children of lesbian or gay parents' or
of heterosexual parents involved in nonmarital relationships 26 may be stigmatized,
embarrassed or subjected to teasing by their peers due to their parents' sexuality. Without
further analysis, most courts go on to assume that stigmatization itself constitutes harm
to the child'27 or to speculate that stigma will lead to some other unidentified harm.'
121. As is frequently the case, there is evidence that the court may have been influenced by an overall negative view
of homosexuality. The court referred to lesbianism as "deviate practice" and assumed that the possibility that the child
might not develop a heterosexual identity was an apparent harm. S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 65.
122. The status of the law in Kentucky is in doubt. Kentucky may have stopped short of adopting a per se rule since
the opinion turns on the evidence before the court. On the other hand, the evidence has nothing to do with the specific facts
of the case. Assuming a willing expert witness was available, identical evidence could be produced in any case involving
a lesbian or gay parent. Once produced, that evidence would determine the outcome of the case. This would seem to be
a minor variation on a per so rule. It is hardly surprising that some argue that Kentucky has adopted a per se rule, while
others claim that Kentucky applies a nexus test.
123. See S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 64. For a more detailed discussion of stigma as a factor in custody cases and a review
of the social science evidence regarding the effects of stigma, see infra notes 161-84.
124. Given the widespread bias against lesbians and gay men, it might seem paradoxical that little evidence exists of
stigmatization of children of lesbian and gay parents and no evidence exists of harm to children from stigmatization.
Perhaps the explanation is that all children are, to some degree, stigmatized by some characteristics of their parents, and
stigmatization causes little or no harm. Or it may be that despite widespread stigmatization of lesbians and gay men
generally, individual lesbian and gay parents and their children are accepted within their communities.
125. See. e.g., Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948, 950 (Conn. 1988); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 66-67; S.E.G. v.
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 833 (N.D. 1993); Collins
v. Collins, No. 87-288-Il, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123, at *5 (Mar. 30, 1988); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
Concerns about stigma also figure into the per se rule and permissible determinative inference cases. See Thigpen v.
Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d
691, 693-94 (Va. 1985). In Fox v. Fox, Nos. 79676, 83590, 1995 WL 422057 (Okla. July 18, 1995), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed an appellate court ruling which rested on "the trauma which may result in the future because of
community members' disapproval of or disagreement with the parent's sexual orientation."
126. See. e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421,424 (11. 1979), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
127. See S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 64. But see M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979.) The
court in M.P. v. .P. rejected the assumption that stigma lends to harm, and noted that as a result of exposure to community
intolerance, children might be
better equipped to search out their own standards of right and wrong, better able to perceive that the
majority is not always correct in its moral judgments, and better able to understand the importance of
conforming their beliefs to the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the constraints of
currently popular sentiment or prejudice.
128. For a discussion of the problem ofjudicial speculation see supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
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Since bias against lesbians and gay men is widespread, virtually any court can invoke the
specter of bias and accompanying stigma, label it "harm," and use that basis to deny
custody. This process effectively circumvents the protections offered by the nexus test.
Similarly, there is the frequently voiced concern that children raised by lesbians or gay
men will not be able to develop an appropriate heterosexual identity of their own.' 29
Courts which raise this concern assume that it is readily apparent that not being
heterosexual would constitute harm to the child. 3 Having made the assumption, they
may deny custody even though proper application of a nexus test would not permit them
to do so.
C. Appellate Review
The critical difference between a nexus analysis and a permissible presumption
analysis is the presence of and reliance on competent evidence. Under a nexus test, a
party must demonstrate, through introduction of competent evidence, harm to the child.
Under a permissible conclusive presumption analysis, no evidence is required. Unless an
appellate court carefully examines the record and the reasoning of the trial court, it may
well approve decisions that rest on assumptions rather than on evidence, particularly
when appellate courts stand ready to affirm on alternative grounds not relied on by the
trial court.''
For example, in D.H. v. J.H.,' the Indiana Court of Appeals expressly rejected use of
a per se rule to deny a lesbian mother custody of her children.'33 The trial court admitted
extensive evidence concerning the mother's sexual activities. The appellate court initially
concluded that the mother's lesbian affairs did not, in and of themselves, warrant denial
of custody. 3 4 Nevertheless, it affirmed the trial court's award of custody. It did so based
on evidence that the mother failed to put away the laundry and to wash the dishes in the
sink, while the father prepared meals when the mother was out "running around" and
assisted the children with their lessons. It seems very unlikely that these factors, taken
alone, would have motivated or justified the trial court's custody award. Although it
acknowledged that the trial court ultimately applied a per se rule, the appellate court left
this seemingly tainted decision intact. The tendency of appellate courts to conduct
deferential reviews allows trial courts to circumvent the nexus test.3 '
The problem of appellate review is even more striking when the appellate court
discovers and relies on factual grounds to support the trial court's decision even though
the trial court never relied on those facts. Thus, even though it appears that the trial court
129. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 66. Although it lacks supporting evidence, this concern is not uncommon.
130. The essence of the assumption is that there is something wrong with being lesbian or gay. By indulging in such
an assumption, the court shows bias against lesbians and gay men.
131. See Mnookin, supra note 31, at 269-70. Affirmance on alternative grounds is, of course, a common appellate
practice. Problems arise, however, when the questions before the trial court were issues offact-the effect of various
factors in a child's life-rather than law.
132.418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
133. The mother did not acknowledge that she was a lesbian. However, the father called two women as witnesses who
testified to their sexual relationships with the mother. The mother, in her own testimony, was never asked about her sexual
conduct. It is a telling irony that although the lesbian mother lost custody of her children, D.H. is cited as a step forward
for lesbian and gay parents because it rejects the use of a per se rule.
134. It is unclear whether her conduct was a factor that could be weighed against her, even in the absence of evidence
of harm. The court seems to reject a permissible determinative inference.
135. See Mnookin, supra note 31, at 269-70 (noting potential forjudges to "disguise" a decision based on an improper
factor through vague references and general language).
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relied solely on an inappropriate basis for awarding custody, the decision will be affirmed
if the appellate court can construct an appropriate basis on which the trial court might
have reached the same conclusion. In such a case, the appellate court effectively
manufactures new grounds for the trial court's decision and, hence, never has to critique
the trial court's application of the nexus test.
For example, in Mohrman v. Mohrman,3 6 the trial court had awarded custody of a child
to a father, stating, "The major issue that the court has to consider is the effect of the
relationship which the [mother] had with Mrs. Hathaway, as it will affect the child."'
37
The mother appealed, contending that the trial court had failed to follow Ohio law, which
enumerates a five-factor test, but also provides that the court shall consider "all relevant
factors."13 Despite the trial court's own statement of the major issue, the appellate court
affirmed. It reasoned that there was other evidence in the record (evidence that did not
pertain to the mother's sexual conduct) that would have supported the trial court's
decision, even though the trial court apparently did not indicate whether this other
evidence played any part in its decision. 3 9 Appellate review like that described in these
cases, which strives to affirm on any possible basis, even one constructed for the first
time by the reviewing court, drains the nexus test of much of its meaning.
IV. A REVIEW OF COURT CONCERNS REGARDING SEXUALLY
PROBLEMATIC PARENTS AND THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
REGARDING THOSE CONCERNS
This Part seeks to extract and examine the concerns which motivate courts to adopt
rules or to reach decisions that restrict the parenting rights of lesbian, gay, or cohabiting
heterosexual parents. These concerns lead courts to distort and misapply the nexus test
with regard to sexually nonconforming parents, to adopt per se rules, or to employ
determinative permissible inferences which clearly disadvantage nonconforming
parents.
41
The most frequently enunciated concerns include fears that children raised in lesbian
or gay households will suffer gender role confusion, will themselves become lesbian or
gay, will be stigmatized and victimized by the intolerant members of the communities in
which they live, or will not be morally fit because the household in which they are raised
is morally suspect. These fears might be understood to reflect genuine (albeit groundless)
136. 565 N.E.2d 1283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
137. Id. at 1285 (Abood, J., concurring). The court in Mohrman ultimately adopted a nexus test. The case is
nevertheless problematic, for it was the appellate court's discovery of other grounds that allowed it to avoid a decision on
whether to adopt a nexus test.
138. Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C) (Anderson 1989).
139. Mohrmrn, 565 N.E.2d at 1285. The court also rejected the mother's complaint that there was no evidence of harm
to the child from the relationship.
See also White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990). In While the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court ruling removing a child from the custody of a lesbian mother in favor of the child's grandparents. As the court stated,
Though the predominant issue in this case seems to have been Mrs. White's lesbian relationship, and the
chancellor may have relied almost entirely on this, we find that a review of the entire record and the
circumstances present.., shows that the chancellor's decision that Mrs. White was an unfit mother,
morally and otherwise, was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Id. at 1184. The record revealed conflicting evidence about whether the children were outside in cold weather without
warm clothing. As the lone dissenting justice rightly observed, the evidence was "no more than one would expect to find
in any case [of] a twenty-four year old mother with but a high school diploma and no independent means." Id. at 1185
(Robertson, J., dissenting).
140. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 543-67.
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concern for the well-being of the children whose lives are shaped by court decisions. As
such, this Article refers to them as "genuine concerns."''
In addition to these genuine concerns, some judges appear to be motivated by general
hostility towards lesbian and gay parents and a desire to punish these individuals for
living in a manner which the court finds unacceptable. Because these concerns are
grounded not in a genuine interest in the child's well-being, but rather, in prejudice and
intolerance, they are illegitimate concerns. They cannot provide a principled basis for
determination of child custody matters.
Restrictive rules applied to cohabiting heterosexual parents spring from some of the
same sources. While concerns about gender identity and sexuality are not usually present
with heterosexual parents, concerns about morality and stigma recur. To a lesser extent
than lesbians and gay men, cohabiting heterosexual parents may also be victims of
prejudice.
It is critical to carefully evaluate the genuine concerns that lead courts to disfavor
sexually nonconforming parents. Inquiry into these concerns is compatible with the
overarching goal of seeking the best interests of the child. The general public widely
shares these concerns. Were the genuine concerns of the courts well-founded, it might be
difficult to deny the necessity for special rules ensuring searching scrutiny for sexually
nonconforming parents. But extensive social science research has shown that these
concerns are, in fact, unwarranted. Children of lesbian and gay parents are like children
of heterosexual parents. Thus, there is no justification for special rules or particular
scrutiny for lesbian and gay parents.
Before turning to a more detailed review of the social science literature, one
observation is in order: Typically, courts are especially critical of openly lesbian, gay,
or cohabiting parents, contrasting them with those who are secretive, "discreet," or
closeted.'42 Thus, a lesbian mother who shields her children from all knowledge of her
sexual identity is seen as less problematic than a lesbian mother who is involved in a
relationship of which her children are aware.'43 Most problematic of all is a lesbian
141. This is not to say I accept them as valid concerns. As I will demonstrate in this Part, there is no real basis for any
of these concerns. They are born of ignorance. Nevertheless, since they may spring from a focus on the well-being of the
child, they are at least potentially genuine.
142. Many courts disparagingly characterize lesbians and gay men who do not conceal their sexuality as "flagrant"
or "notorious," as "flaunting" their sexuality. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 639 (111. App. Ct. 1993)
(noting that trial judge characterized mother as a "defiant and hostile admitted lesbian" in ordering only supervised
visitation); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that the mother "flagrantly flaunted"
her relationship); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Va. 1985) (approvingly quoting the trial judge's observation that
"sharing the same bed or bedroom with a child being in the home would be one of the greatest degrees of flaunting that
one could imagine"); see also S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (observing with apparent
disapproval that the mother had "chosen not to make her sexual preference private but invites acknowledgment and
imposes her preference upon her children and her community'); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 893 (S.D. 1992)
(noting with disapproval that "[oln some occasions when the children were not present, Lisa publicly danced with females,
kissing and caressing them on the dance floor"); Fajer, supra note 3, at 570-84 (citing numerous cases of public and private
harassment and discrimination against lesbians and gays for "flaunting" their homosexuality by speaking openly about
it or by openly having a relationship with a member of the same sex.). The same attitude is apparent in cases involving
heterosexual couples. See e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (il. 1979) (discussing the Illinois fornication statute
in the context ofnonmarital cohabitation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580, 582 (La. Ct.
App. 1977). This same phenomena has been observed in Canada. See Cynthia Peterson, Living Dangerously: Speaking
Lesbian, Preaching Law, 7 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 318, 330 n.30 (1994).
143. This is at once predictable and ironic. It is predictable because when the parent is involved in an ongoing sexual
relationship, the relationship and hence the parent's sexual identity will more likely come to the attention of the child and
will probably eventually become a topic of conversation. Thus, the concerns about harm arise with greater force. But it
is ironic because, as a general matter, many find sexual conduct in the context of long-term committed relationships less
problematic than sex outside of any committed relationship. A parent picking up a complete stranger for sex in a car may
generate less judicial concern because the child is not exposed to the relationship, and hence does not learn from it. See
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mother who is open about her lesbianism, so that others in the community as well as her
children are aware of her identification.
The reasons why courts find an open lesbian mother more problematic than one who
is "discreet" are directly related to the underlying concerns that motivate the court. If, for
example, neither the child nor the surrounding community is aware of the mother's sexual
identity, then the mother's identity poses no problem in terms of the child's sexual
identity, gender role, or potential exposure to stigma.'44 If the child is aware of the
mother's sexual identity, but the surrounding community is not, then at least the problem
of stigma may be nonexistent.'45 If the child and the community are aware of the mother's
identity, then all of the potential problems may be implicated. Thus, the concerns may be
seen to arise not from the mother's conduct (which at least theoretically could be kept
sufficiently private) but from her identification as a lesbian.
The preference for complete discretion leads courts to penalize lesbian and gay parents
for conduct that would be entirely unremarkable for heterosexual parents. Virtually any
display of affection may remove a homosexual parent from the preferred "discreet"
category. Thus, holding hands, hugging or kissing, occupying the same bedroom (or even
the same house), and simple verbal expressions of affection may be the basis on which
a lesbian mother or gay father is denied custody.' No similar results follow for
heterosexual parents.'47
The judicial preference for "discreet" lesbians and gay men also inclines courts, when
they do award custody or visitation to a lesbian or gay parent, to impose restrictions
designed to "shield" the child from evidence of their parent's sexual identity. These
might include directives that a lover not be present in the home when the child is present
or that no other lesbian or gay individuals be present, or that the child not be taken to any
events where they would be exposed to lesbian and gay people.'
Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (expressing a clear preference for "clandestine" relationships).
144. This may also make a court more likely to award sexually problematic parents custody of or visitation with young
children. The court's reason that the children and their friends are unable to understand the issues surrounding sexual
identity and are therefore unaffected by them. See Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1984); see also Rivers
v. Rivers, 322 N.W.2d 864, 865 (S.D. 1982) (barring overnight visitation with unmarried father who lived with woman
not his wife because of the harnfiul effect the misconduct would cause a child "old enough to see and recognize it"); Roe,
324 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting the trial court's great concern about 'what happened when child turns twelve or thirteen").
145. This too may lend to surprising results. In Peyton, 457 So. 2d at 321, the child's mother lived with a woman to
whom she was not married as did the child's father. The court noted that society tends to make assumptions about a man
and a woman who live together without the benefit of marriage that it does not make about two women. That is, the
relationship between a man and a woman is assumed to be sexual, while no such assumption is made about the two
women. Although the court did not identify it as such, this is one aspect of "lesbian invisibility." The court concluded that
as long as the two women are not "notorious," the child would not likely suffer opprobrium while living with them. Id.
at 324-25. Indeed, the court seemed to suggest that the child was safer there than in the father's household. Thus, in this
case lesbian invisibility worked to the advantage of the particular lesbian mother involved.
146. For example, in Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-1, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123, at * 3 (Mar. 30, 1988), the court
observed that "[allthough the mother testified that the affection demonstrated between her partners and herself in the
presence of her daughter was never inappropriate," the daughter's testimony showed that the mother and her lover slept
in the same bed as well as the same bedroom, that they loved each other, and that they kissed. Many courts adopt a similar
tone of thinly veiled contempt in discussing the activities of lesbian and gay parents. See also Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693
(agreeing with the trial court that the father's behavior "flies in the face of... society's mores"').
147. See, e.g., French v. French, 452 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing the trial court which denied
visitation to father because his children observed him having intercourse with his girlfriend).
148. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637 (IH]. App. Ct. 1993) (reversing the trial court's condition that
the lesbian mother not have the child in the presence of any person of known homosexual tendencies or take child to any
gathering or place of a homosexual nature); In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281,293-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding
the "best interests of the child" standard inappropriate, and thus reversing the trial court's order that no visitation occur
in the presence of any female with whom the mother was residing because the father failed to demonstrate threat of
"serious endangerment'); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (restricting the mother from
exposing elements ofher 'alternative life-style' to her children); li re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
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However it is manifested, the preference for "discreet" lesbians and gay men and the
restrictions spawned by this preference are deeply misguided and run counter to any
interest in the well-being of children of lesbian and gay parents.' They encourage the
isolation of lesbian and gay parents, cutting them off from their most significant sources
of support.5 0 Further, such preferences appear to be specifically designed to ensure the
isolation of the children.'
1974) (prohibiting cohabitation with anyone but lawful spouse while child present), off d, 362 A.2d 54 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div 1976); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (App. Div. 1978) (prohibiting visitation with mother's lover
present); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1976) (ordering that the child may not stay overnight at the mother's
home, prohibiting visitation with mother's lover or other homosexuals present, ordering that the child may not be taken
where known homosexuals are present, and ordering that the child may not be involved in homosexual activities or
publicity); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775, 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming the trial court's ruling that gay
father not be permitted to have boyfriends visit him while his minor son is present); Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (permitting visitation only on condition that children do not learn that father is gay); Chicoine v.
Chieoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992) (reversing trial court decision allowing children visitation with lesbian mother on
alternate weekends and holidays plus three weeks in the summer provided no unrelated women and no homosexual men
were present, describing the trial court's visitation order as "liberal" and requiring a home study and adequate enforcement
procedures); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391,395-96 (Tean. Ct. App. 1981) (restricting visitation sua sponte); Kallas
v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980) (reversing trial court order which prohibited lesbian mother from doing or saying
anything in the presence of children "which directly or indirectly touches upon her lifestyle or sexual preference," id. at
646, so that lower court could enter more restrictive order); Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694 (reversing the trial court award of
custody to the father on the condition that he not share his bed or bedroom with any male lover or friend while child is
present and instead denying custody and allowing visitation only outside of the father's home and outside the presence
of the father's lover). By imposing visitation or custody conditions, many court's effectively force lesbian and gay parents
to choose between their lovers and their children. See, e.g., Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 637; Lundin v. Lundin, 563 S.W.2d
1273, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
149. Even where courts award custody to a nonlesbian or gay parent, the child still has a lesbian or gay parent. Unless
courts intend to terminate all contact between the parent and child, the parent will continue to be a significant figure inq
the child's life. If that relationship is to be a positive one, it must be based on trust and respect. The judicial orders
described above promote neither.
150. Eileen F. Levy, Strengthening the Coping Resources ofL esbian Families, 73 FAMIUES SOC'Y 23, 28-29 (1992).
See also Catherine Rand et al., Psychological Health and Factors the Court Seeks to Control in Lesbian Mother Custody
Trials, 8.J. HOMOSEXUAITY 27 (1982) (stating that the lesbian mother's sense of well-being correlates with the extent
to which she is open about her identity with employers, ex-husbands, and children); Suzanne Slater & Julie Mencher, The
Lesbian FamilyLife Cycle: A Contextual Approach, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 372, 380 (1991) (noting the value of
a sense of community for lesbian families).
Restrictions on the mother's conduct may well have an effect on the child. For example, at least one small study has
shown that daughters of lesbians who live with their lovers have higher self-esteem than daughters of lesbian mothers who
do not live with their lovers. Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative Study of Self-Esteem ofAdolescent Children of Divorced
Lesbim Mothers and Divorced Heterosexual Mothers, 18 .HoMosExuALrrY 123, 132-33 (1989).
151. The disparate treatment of discreet versus open lesbian parents also contributes to the law's domestication of
lesbians generally. "Domestication" is a concept employed by lesbian legal theorist Ruthann Robson. See ROBSON, supra
note 70, at 18-19. The law domesticates when it induces conformity to particular roles, without regard for one's true nature.
The law concerning child custody creates and reinforces categories of "good" and "bad" lesbians. "Good lesbians," who
are more socially acceptable and temperate, are favored over "bed lesbians," who are disruptive and threatening. The more
effectively a lesbian conforms to the monogamous heterosexual model (and in so doing, obscures the potentially
subversive nature of lesbianism) the more favorably she will be treated. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. This
at once encourages lesbian mothers to conform to the monogamous heterosexual model and divides the lesbian community
into the socially acceptable (and hence legally privileged) lesbians and the socially unacceptable lesbians. See ROBSON,
supra note 70, at 132-34. Ultimately, domestication may be antithetical to lesbian survival. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins,
No. 87-238-11, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 at "15 (Mar. 30, 1988) (romlin, J., concurring) (supporting award of custody
to a lesbian only on condition that she completely suppresses her identity as a lesbian); see also Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian
Mothers Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 907 (1986)
(advocating recognition of legal parenthood of both mothers).
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A. Social Science Literature and Judicial Concerns
Regarding Gender Roles, Sexual Identity,
and Social Stigma
Estimates of the number of lesbian and gay parents and their children vary widely,
ranging from one to five million lesbian mothers, one to three million gay fathers, and
six to fourteen million children of lesbian and gay parents.'52 In recent years a substantial
number of studies of children of lesbians and, to a lesser extent, children of gay men have
been conducted. There is now an extensive body of social science literature on the well-
being of these children. The literature emphatically demonstrates that there is no basis for
any generalized concern about harm to children from being raised by lesbian and gay
parents. A review of recent studies shows that there are no reported negative effects on
children resulting directly from their parent's sexual orientation' 53
This Section will consider separately each of the genuine concerns for which there is
relevant social science research. After illustrating the way in which the concerns motivate
courts in their development of restrictive custody rules, this Section will review the social
152. Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1026 (1992); see also Nan
D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L.
REV. 691 (1976); Laura Lott-Whitehead & Carol T. Tully, The Family Lives of Lesbian Mothers, 63 SMITH C. STUD. SOC.
WORK 265, 265 (1993).
153. Patterson, supra note 152. After conducting a detailed review of the available studies, Patterson concludes that
[tlhere is no evidence to suggest that psychosocial development among children of gay men or lesbians
is compromised in any respect relative to that among offspring of heter6sexual parents. Not a single study
has found children of gay or lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to
children of heterosexual parents.
Id. at 1036; see J. Michael Bailey et al., Sexual Orientation ofAdult Sons of Gay Fathers, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PsYCHOL.
124 (1995); Patricia J. Falk Lesbian Mothers: Psychosocial Assumptions in Family Law, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 941 (1989);
David K. Flaks et al., Lesbians Choosing Motherhood: A Comparative Study of Lesbian and Heterosexual Parents and
Their Children, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 105 (1995); Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-
Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551 (1983) (finding
no significant differences on gender role measures between children of lesbian mothers and control group children); Julie
S. Gottman, Children of Gay andLesbian Parents, 14 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 177 (1989); Richard Green et al., Lesbian
Mothers and Their Children: A Comparison with Solo Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 167 (1986); Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual
Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 696 (1978) (finding no significant difference in gender role identity); Beverly
Hoeffer, Children's Acquisition of Sex-Role Behavior in Lesbian-Mother Families, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 536
(1981); Mary E. Hotvedt & Jane B. Mandel, Children of Lesbian Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 275 (William Paul et al. eds., 1982); Huggins, supra note 150, at 132-33;
Martha Kirkpatrick et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545
(1981) (finding no significant difference in gender role identity); Karen G. Lewis, Children of Lesbians: Their Point of
Niew, 25 Soc. WORK 198 (1980) (describing how children of lesbian mothers talk about their adjustment to knowledge
of their mothers' lesbianism); Lott-Whitehead & Tully, supra note 152, at 265 (demonstrating that there is no negative
effect on self-esteem and social adjustment); Ann O'Connell, Voices from the Heart: The Development Impact of a
Mother's Lesbianism on Her Adolescent Children, 63 SMrrH C. STUD. SoC. WORK 281 (1993) (finding no correlation
between parents' sexual orientation and sexual orientation of child); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of the Lesbian Baby
Boon,: Behavioral Adjustment, Self-Concepts, and Sex Role Identity, in LESBIAN AND GAY PSYCHOLOGY 156 (Beverly
Greene & Gregory M. Herek eds., 1994) (examining children born to or adopted by lesbian mothers) [hereinafter Patterson,
Lesbian Baby Boom 1]; Charlotte J. Patterson, Families of the Lesbian Baby Boom: Parents' Division of Labor and
Children's Adjustment, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 115 (1995) [hereinafter Patterson, Lesbian Baby Boom 11];
Charlotte J. Patterson, Sexual Orientation and Human Development: An Overview, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3
(1995) [hereinafter Patterson, Overview]; see also Elizabeth D. Gibbs, Psychosocial Development of Children Raised by
Lesbian Mothers: A Review offResearch, 8 WOMEN & THERAPY 65 (1989) (reviewing literature).
Those problems that did emerge for the studied children related more to society's rejection ofhomosexuality than to
poor parent-child relationships. Additionally, most of the observed social adjustment problems also occurred in the control
groups because children from both groups had a history of divorce in their family. Gottman, supra, at 186.
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science literature relevant to those concerns. In all cases, this review shows that the
particular concerns, while perhaps genuine, are in fact unfounded.
Some courts have restricted visitation or denied custody to a lesbian mother or gay
father because of concerns about the impact of exposure to the parent's community on
the child's development of an appropriate gender role"54 or gender identity.'55 Judicial
concern about gender roles is unwarranted. Recent surveys of gender role studies of
children show no significant differences between children of lesbian mothers and children
in a control group.' There is no support in social science research for restricting custody
for lesbians or gay men out of concern for a child's gender identity as the parent's sexual
orientation has no discernible impact.
Another recurrent theme in many judicial decisions restricting custody or visitation is
that the child will grow up to be lesbian or gay, like their parent. 57 The sexual orientation
of children of lesbian mothers is often of concern to the children themselves, to extended
family members, to society generally, and to the courts as well.
The general consensus among researchers is that there is no correlation between a
parent's sexual orientation and the sexual orientation of the child. 50 The incidence of
same-sex orientation among children of homosexual parents occurs as frequently and in
the same proportion as in the general population. Most adolescents-including, but by
no means limited to, children of lesbian and gay parents-have some concern about being
gay or lesbian.'59 Thus, there is no basis for restrictive rules based on concerns about
development of sexuality. 6 '
Many courts are concerned about possible stigmatization of a child raised by a lesbian
or gay parent or by a heterosexual parent living with someone to whom they are not
married.' Courts either conclude that the stigma is, in and of itself, harm or that it may
lead to harm. The issue of stigma may arise from genuine concern for the well-being of
the child. At the same time, courts frequently invoke the specter of stigmatization as a
154. "Gender role" refers to behaviors and attitudes that society positively sanctions for members of one sex and
negatively sanctions for members of the opposite sex. Gottman, supra note 153, at 180.
155. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637 (IIl. App. Ct. 1993); Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273,
1275-77 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
156. Gottnan, supra note 153, at 180; Patterson, supra note 152, at 1030-31; see also Gibbs, supra note 153, at 70;
Golombok etal., supra note 153, at 551; Green, supra note 153, at 696; Hoeffer, supra note 153, at 536; Kirkpatrick et
al., supra note 153, at 551; Patterson, Lesbian Baby Boom I, supra note 153, at 156.
157. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067,1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (S.D. 1992); Collins v.
Collins, No. 87-238-, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123, at *7 (Mar. 30,1988); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1982).
158. O'Connell, supra note 153, at 285; Patterson, supra note 152, at 1031-32. While many of the individual studies
may be small, in all, more than 300 children of lesbian and gay parents have been assessed in 12 different samplings and
"no evidence has been found for significant disturbances of any kind in the development of sexual identity among these
individuals." Id. at 1032. These findings should not be surprising since most lesbians and gay men are the children of
heterosexual parents.
159. Children of lesbians sometimes attribute their anxiety over sexuality to the presence of a lesbian mother, but their
anxieties are not different from those of children with heterosexual parents. Attribution of the anxiety to having a lesbian
mother reflects the fact that children of lesbians may be unaware that children of heterosexual parents share their concerns.
O'Connell, supra note 153, at 295. In general, anxiety generated by isolation was less problematic for children who had
contact with other children of lesbians. I at 294.
160. This should not be allowed to obscure an underlying fundamental question: Even if it were established that
children of lesbian or gay parents are more likely to grow up to be lesbian or gay, would that constitute evidence that these
parents harm or damage their children?
161. See S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64. Courts usually fear that stigmatization would manifest itselfin teasing or harassment
of the children by their peers or by members of the community at large. Some courts express concern that the child will
feel embarrassed.
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makeweight when they have already concluded the parent's sexual orientation is
disqualifying.1
62
It is easy to understand how a court might legitimately be concerned about how the
larger community receives the children of lesbian or gay parents. Lesbians and gay men
themselves are the targets of violence motivated solely by their sexual identification. On
a lesser scale, they are subjected to discrimination, both blatant and subtle, in many
aspects of their lives. In recent years lesbians and gay men have become the focus of
organized political campaigns to restrict their rights. 63 For all these reasons, a
compassionate judge might well be concerned about the prospect of placing a child within
a lesbian or gay household.'"
Still, the general concern about societal treatment of lesbians and gay men does not
justify custody decisions limiting the rights of lesbian and gay parents. A court should
only conclude that stigma justifies a denial of custody after satisfying four independent
requirements. First, there must be proof that there is in fact some perceptible stigma
against a particular child. The fact that lesbians and gay men may be stigmatized
generally, or even that the particular lesbian mother or gay father might be stigmatized
in other aspects of her or his life, does not demonstrate that a child is or will be
stigmatized. Second, it must be shown that there is a connection between the stigma the
child experiences and some harm to the child. Stigma is not, in and of itself, harm. Third,
the court must consider whether an award of custody to the more conforming parent will
in fact affect the degree of harm caused by stigma, for no matter who has custody, the
child will still have a sexually nonconforming parent. Fourth, a court should consider
whether an award of custody premised on societal bias is sound or even acceptable
policy. Each step in this progression must be examined separately.
First, courts readily assume that there will be stigmatization without any apparent
evidence. It seems adequate for the contesting parent to point out that the parent is
sexually nonconforming. From that, the actual fact of stigmatization follows.'65 In fact,
research shows that fear of stigmatization is far in excess of the actual incidence of
stigmatization.'66 There has been only one reported opinionin which evidence of teasing
was offered.'67 Although social science research on this question is limited, it also has
revealed little evidence of harassment or other stigmatization of children of lesbian, gay,
or otherwise nonconforming parents.'" Thus, the very first assumption that a child will
be subjected to some form of harassment or teasing is questionable.
Second, the simple fact of teasing, or other manifestations of stigmatization, should be
irrelevant unless it can be shown that the stigmatization results in harm to the child. Thus,
even if a court is satisfied that a particular child will be stigmatized, the court should
consider whether that stigmatization will lead to harm. Many courts have simply assumed
162. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421
(III. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
163. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
164. Similar concerns may be expressed in cases involving cohabiting heterosexual couples, although the level of
societal tolerance of cohabitation makes these cases unusual.
165. This is inappropriate judicial speculation. See supra text accompanying notes 112-24.
166. See Golombok et al., supra note 153, at 565-67; Hotvedt & Mandel, supra note 153, at 282; Huggins, supra note
150, at 152.
167. Flaks, supra note 87, at 363; see also Courtney R. Baggett, Sexual Orientation: Should it Affect Child Custody
Rulings, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 189 (1992).
168. See Green, supra note 153, at 695-96 (finding that only three of 21 children studied were subjected to teasing);
see also Lewis, supra note 153, at 200 (discussing the fear of negative peer reaction among children of lesbian mothers).
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that stigmatization based on the sexual identity of a parent generally leads to harm to the
child, usually in the form of low self-esteem. This is not a proposition that is so
transparently obvious as to obviate the need for authority. In fact, the social science
literature offers no support for this proposition. 69 In the absence of scientific support,
courts should not simply assume there will be harm to each child.
Social adjustment and self-esteem are interrelated for children. Children of lesbian
mothers must often cope with the disruption of divorce as well as the potential effects of
the social stigma of having a lesbian mother. For the children studied, divorce was far
more significant in terms of its effect on the children than their mother's sexuality.'70
Lesbians' children who experience divorce exhibit the same behaviors as children of
heterosexual parents who divorce: vulnerability, concern that basic needs will not be met,
concern for the parent's well-being, anger, and conflicted loyalties.'
7
'
The effects of homosexuality's social stigma on children can take the form of a desire
for secrecy and isolation if the children cannot express their feelings to their mothers,
other family members, and peers. Research indicates that the more comfortable a mother
is in disclosing her sexuality, the fewer problems the children will have because they will
be able to ask questions and express their feelings.'17 Another study found that the
younger the child at the time of disclosure, the greater the level of comfort and
acceptance.'7 The mother's comfort level with her sexual orientation and access to
children of other lesbians decreased the children's sense of isolation and correlated with
the children's ability to talk to someone about their experiences. 74
As to self-esteem, there is no significant difference between the self-esteem of children
of lesbian mothers compared to children of heterosexual mothers.t7S Among children of
lesbian mothers, those with the highest self-esteem also reported positive feelings about
their mother's lesbianism and about the fact that their mothers had a long-term partner
who lived in the home. 176 Intimacy modeled in the home during a daughter's life
benefited her sense of security and well-being, regardless of the sex of the mother's
partner.'
77
In fact, children of lesbian mothers had strengths differentiating them from children
of heterosexual mothers. The children felt that their mothers were more open, easier to
talk to, and more respectful. 171 Children were proud of their mother's strength in standing
up for their beliefs. 79 The most frequently reported benefit was an increased
understanding of prejudice and a heightened ability to think critically about the impact
of discrimination. 0 The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in a case
169. See Patterson, supra note 152, at 1034 (summarizing studies revealing that "children of lesbian and gay parents
have normal relationships with peers and.., their relationships with adults of both sexes are also satisfactory").
170. Gottman, supra note 153, at 186; Lewis, supra note 153, at 199; O'Connell, supra note 153, at 294.
171. O'Connell, supra note 153, at 287.
172. Lewis, supra 153, at 199.
173. O'Connell, supra note 153, at 287.
174. Id. at 289-90.
175. Gottman, supra note 153, at 183; Green et al., supra note 153, at 180; Huggins, supra note 150, at 131-34;
Patterson, Lesbia Baby Boom I, supra note 153, at 167-68.
176. Gottman, supranote 153, at 183.
177. Id. at 190. Thus, orders which permit custody or visitation only ifa lesbian mother or gay father does not live
with a lover work to the child's detriment.
178. O'Connell, supra note 153, at 293.
179. Lewis, supra note 153, at 203.
180. O'Connell, supra note 153, at 296.
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involving a lesbian mother's custody request, eloquently addressed the problem of
stigmatization:
If [the lesbian mother] retains custody, it may be that because the community is
intolerant of her differences these girls may sometimes have to bear themselves with
greater than ordinary fortitude. But this does not necessarily portend that their moral
welfare or safety will be jeopardized. It is just as reasonable to expect that they will
emerge better equipped to search out their own standards of right and wrong, better able
to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral judgments, and better able
to understand the importance of conforming their beliefs to the requirements of reason
and tested knowledge, not the constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice.
Taking the children from [the mother] can be done only at the cost of sacrificing
those very qualities they will find most sustaining in meeting the challenges inevitably
ahead. Instead of forbearance and feelings of protectiveness, it will foster in them a
sense of shame for their mother. Instead of courage and the precept that people of
integrity do not shrink from bigots, it counsels the easy option of shirking difficult
problems and following the course of expedience. Lastly, it diminishes their regard for
the rule of human behavior, everywhere accepted, that we do not forsake those to whom
we are indebted for love and nurture merely because they are held in low esteem by
others. '
There is no basis on which a court can assume that harm must follow from stigma.
Third, even when there is evidence of some harm from teasing or harassment, courts
should assess it in the overall context of the child's life, rather than in isolation.'
Virtually all children are, from time to time, embarrassed by their parents and teased by
their peers. Few, if any, suffer lasting or significant harm. Courts must conduct their
analysis with the understanding that unless parental rights are terminated, the child will
continue to have a lesbian, gay, or cohabiting parent and may well suffer the same stigma.
Thus, even if custody is awarded to the more conforming parent, the child may
experience the same stigmatization.
Finally, courts must consider whether the unfortunate reality of societal intolerance
should be legitimized and reified by the court. The United States Supreme Court has
explicitly prohibited reliance on racial prejudice as a justification for decision in a child
custody case, even though that prejudice is quite real.' Similarly, courts have refused
to rely on the continued existence of religious intolerance in deciding custody cases."'
These cases recognize that if we seek to construct a society free of prejudice and
discrimination, then we cannot rely on prejudice and discrimination as the basis for our
judicial decisions. A court should consider the overall cost of its endorsement of the
intolerance of others before allowing the possibility of stigma to become a relevant factor
in deciding custody.
181. M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); see also S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875,
879 (Alaska 1985) (rejecting reliance on social stigma as the basis for a finding of harm).
182. One study of children of lesbian mothers revealed that the children reported more reactions to stress but also a
greater sense of well-being. See Patterson, Lesbian Baby Boom 1, supra note 153, at 169-70. The increased stress reactivity
might be attributable to stigma or it might be attributable to a greater willingness to report negative emotions. In any event,
concern about stigma must be tempered by the enhanced sense of overall well-being. Interestingly, both phenomena might
be explained by a greater willingness on the part of children of lesbians to report emotions. Id
183. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
184. See cases cited infra note 265.
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B. Judicial Concern About Moral Well-Being
One common reason for restricting custody or visitation of lesbian and gay parents is
concern for the moral fitness of the parent and the moral well-being of the child.'85 Moral
fitness arguments are often raised against parents who are engaged in nonmarital
heterosexual relationships as well.'86
On its surface, a moral fitness argument may appear to be simple and straightforward.
Suppose the mother is a lesbian involved in a sexual relationship. The father may argue
that the mother or her conduct is immoral. If the court accepts this premise, the father can
then continue by reasoning that if the child resides with the mother, the mother will
inevitably teach the child that the mother's conduct is in fact acceptable.' 87 Assuming the
premise that the mother's conduct is immoral, this must be recognized as an injury to the
child's moral well-being, because the child will grow up with the understanding that the
mother's immoral conduct is moral. In sum, if the mother raises the child, the child will
have no proper sense of right and wrong. Hence, the child ought not be placed with the
mother because to do so would cause moral harm to the child. 88
The moral unfitness argument rests entirely on the court's acceptance of the premise
that the lesbian mother's conduct is immoral."8 9 A critical question that must be explored
is how a court might reach such a conclusion. In fact, there is no legitimate, principled
basis on which a court can make this determination, and hence, it is not an appropriate
determination for a trial court to make. Without such a determination, the arguments
concerning parental morality do not assist the resolution of custody questions.
How is a judge to determine whether a lesbian mother's sexual conduct is moral? A
principled judge should not simply enforce her or his own personal morality. There is no
social consensus about the morality of homosexual conduct or even nonmarital
185. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d
1181,1183-84 (Miss. 1990); GA. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. CL App. 1987); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164,
165-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-1, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 at *9-30 (Mar. 30, 1988)
(Tomlin, J., concurring); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691,
893-94 (Va. 1985).
Despite the misgivings discussed in this section, I have included moral fitness as one of the genuine concerns a court
might have. I do so because concerns for the moral well-being of the child may be motivated by real concern for the
welfare of a particular child.
For an extended discussion of morality with regard to sexuality in child custody cases, see Katz, supra note 55.
186. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E2d 421, 424 (Il. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); Beck v. Beck, 341
So. 2d 580, 582 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978). But see Fletcher
v. Fletcher, 504 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the mother's two extramarital affairs, though immoral,
were improper factors to consider where no evidence of harm to the child), rev'd in part, 526 N.W.2d 988 (Mich. 1994).
187. In adopting this reasoning, one court remarked that "[lit is within common knowledge and experience that a child
learns by example, especially from its parents." Beck, 341 So. 2d at 582.
188. This reasoning could be used to justify a per se rle denying custody to all sexually nonconforming parents, a
permissible determinative inference against such parents, or any other form of legal disadvantage in a custody
determination. Taken to its extreme, it could even justify cutting off all contact with the mother, since even if the child
is not raised by the mother, regular contact with the mother would convey the same moral lesson. This partially explains
the frequency of restrictions on visitation. See, e.g., Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
189. I do not propose to argue the morality of lesbian conduct in this Article, although I believe it to be moral. Others
have effectively presented this perspective. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 549-57. Instead, I argue that courts lack a
legitimate basis for any assessment of morality.
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heterosexual conduct; 90 instead, the morality of much sexual conduct is both contested
and unsettled. 9" Under these conditions, invocation of universally accepted standards of
morality is unpersuasive.'
9 2
Most commonly, judges who have attempted to address this challenge have supported
their conclusions about immorality through reference to criminal law. For example, where
homosexual conduct is criminalized, a judge concludes that homosexual conduct is
immoral.193
A court can properly rely on criminal law to identify immoral conduct under either of
two arguments. First, a court might assert that all criminal conduct is necessarily immoral
conduct. This argument rests on the premise that criminalization of an activity reflects
ajudgment that it is immoral. If such an argument were accepted, then it could support
the conclusion that where homosexual conduct is illegal, it is also immoral. Second, and
less sweeping, a court could assert that although not all criminal conduct is immoral,
some systematically defined subset of criminal conduct also constitutes immoral conduct.
A court must offer some general rationale for separating those activities which are both
criminal and immoral from those activities which are criminal but not immoral. That is,
there must be a reason why some crimes constitute immoral conduct and others do not.
If the court cannot articulate a rationale, then the fact that a particular activity may be
subject to criminal penalties proves nothing. A court cannot pick through the criminal
code and identify some criminal activity as immoral without offering a justification for
its choices. 94
The complete equation of illegality with immorality has never been accepted in custody
cases. It is neither a feasible nor desirable approach. If a parent who breaks the law is to
190. For different perspectives on this issue, see John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, ad "Sexual Orientation", 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1049 (1994) (arguing that homosexual conduct is always immoral); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of
Homosexual Conduct: A Reply to John Finnis, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 41 (1995) (arguing that
homosexual conduct may be moral); Paul J. Weithman, A Propos of Professor Perry A Pleafor Philosophy in Sexual
Ethics, 9 NO'tE DAME J.L. ETHcs &PUB. POL'Y 75 (1995) (rejecting Finnis' thesis while critiquing Perry's argument).
Finnis argues that all sexual activity, save for marital noncontracepted intercourse, is immoral. Finnis, supra, at 1068 n.50.
Thus, his definition of immoral conduct encompasses nonmarital heterosexual intercourse as well.
The lack of consensus is also reflected in the varying legal treatment of homosexual and nonmarital heterosexual
conduct. In some states sodomy (defined in many varied ways, some of which include heterosexual and perhaps even
marital sexual activity) is illegal, although not frequently prosecuted. Other states and many municipalities have adopted
laws protecting the civil rights of lesbians and gay men. See generally Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in
the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283 (1994). This presumably reflects a
judgment that the conduct of these citizens is not immoral. In response, still other jurisdictions have adopted voter
initiatives that reflect a critical view of the morality of lesbian or gay male sexual conduct. See, e.g., supra note 8.
191. It might be tempting to argue that particular lesbian sexual conduct is moral-for example, sexual conduct in the
context of a long-term, committed, monogamous relationship. But to make such an argument is to suggest that other
lesbian sexual conduct is not moral-for example, nonmonogamous, anonymous sex. This invites the good lesbian/bad
lesbian problem noted by Robson. See generally ROBSON, supra note 70; Robson, supra note 70.
192. Although this speculation is beyond the scope of this Article, I would nevertheless suggest that where there is
societal consensus on the morality of certain conduct, a judge might rely on that consensus. Of course, even under those
circumstances it might be difficult for a judge to determine the precise content of the agreed upon moral standard.
Furthermore, I would not necessarily agree that when a parent's conduct is deemed immoral by reference to a consensus
standard it is appropriate to take that into account at a custody determination. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
193. Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I1, 1988 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 123 at *9 (Mar. 30, 1988) (Tomlin, J., concurring); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1995). This
reasoning may rest on the assumption that lesbians and gay men must engage in the prohibited activity, even though it may
not be proved in court. See Pershing, supra note 49, at 294-95. In any given case, this assumption may be entirely
unwarranted. See ROBSON, supra note 70, at 47-57. This is not to say, however, that the existence of a sodomy statute is
conclusive as to custody. Massachusetts, Michigan, and South Carolina all have sodomy statutes yet apply a nexus test.
See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.W.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980); Michigan v. Brown, 212 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973);
Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
194. In doing so, a judge does little more than substitute her or his own judgments of morality.
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be judged immoral, vast numbers of parents must be so judged. Countless parents violate
traffic laws, laws prohibiting photocopying of copyright materials, or taperecording
records or compact discs. Indeed, it is widely recognized that the law criminalizes a wide
range of activities in which most citizens engage.19' No one would seriously suggest that
the fact that a parent made a cassette recording of a favorite record so that it could be
played in the car demonstrates that the parent is immoral and, therefore, should be
generally relevant at a custody hearing. 96 The assertion that the criminal law provides a
guide for determining immoral conduct simply proves too much and is therefore
untenable.
This leaves the second argument-that although the criminal law generally does not
define immorality, some subset of those laws do define immorality. The problem then
becomes identifying the subset of criminal laws which define immorality. Any resolution
of this problem faces two challenges-constructing a principled basis for distinguishing
between criminal laws which define morality and those which do not, and justifying the
authority of the court to draw the distinction.
If the distinction chosen were a well-recognized and widely shared one, then the
problem of justifying the court's authority would be diminished. For example, if offenses
deemed malum in se were considered to be immoral, then the authority of a court to make
that distinction might be less problematic. The recognition of some offenses as malum
in se is widely shared. Yet the malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction turns out to be
unsatisfactory. Theft and assault are considered malum in se, and yet whether parents
have ever committed these acts is not generally a subject for inquiry as moral issues in
custody cases.
9 7
If the distinction between immoral and moral criminal conduct is not widely shared,
then the justification for judicial authority to draw the distinction becomes critical. If
judges lack authority simply to define morality as they choose, then they also lack
authority to define morality as they choose by picking among various criminal statutes.
None of the opinions cited offer any explanation for the court's identification of
criminal laws that define morality. When courts rely on criminal law as a codification of
morality in custody cases, they rely on a very small subset of criminal law-some (but
not all) offenses concerning consensual sexual activities. Thus, the trial court may
condemn Sharon Bottoms because she engaged in illegal, and hence, immoral conduct:
oral sex. 19' That Sharon Bottoms' mother, the opposing party in the custody case, also
violated Virginia law regarding consensual sexual activities'99 was of no significance to
195. See Stephen J. Adler & Wade Lambert, Common Criminals: Just About Everyone Violates Some Laws, Even
Model Citizens, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1993, at Al, A6. The article discusses a wide range of laws that are commonly
violated, including tax laws (failing to report tips, for example, constitutes tax evasion), prohibitions on gambling,
copyright laws, and drug and alcohol laws.
196. Were such conduct generally relevant in a custody hearing, the discovery that would follow would be a
nightmare.
197. See Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242,245 (Va. Ct. App. 1973) (granting custody to a mother married to a man
who murdered the child's father because there was no evidence that "the potential for harm [was] great or long lasting or
that the [mother could] not adequately help the child confront and accept the situation"). Moon is particularly noteworthy
given Virginia's willingess to assume harm in the context of lesbian and gay parents. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d
102 (Va. 1995); Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 691.
The fact that these types of crimes are not typically considered to show immorality does not mean that a court could
not adopt a standard that included them. But this might take us far from the best interests of the child. The fact that a
mother brought supplies home from her office for personal use (probably theft by deception) or that a father may have
gotten into a fight at some time (potentially an assault) does not pertain to their general capacity as parents.
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1995) (prohibiting crimes against nature).
199. Id. § 18.2-344 (prohibiting sexual intercourse between two people who are not married).
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the court. It offered no explanation for its concern with some criminal consensual conduct
and its complete lack of interest in other equally criminal conduct."' Many heterosexual
Virginians violate the same statute that Sharon Bottoms might have violated, yet this does
not matter in their custody cases.
20 1
All of this points out one of the underlying problems with allowing inquiry into, and
judicial determination of, the moral fitness of a parent in a custody case. Short of
selecting all of criminal law-an alternative no one would accept-there is no legitimate
principled basis on which a court can assess morality. Therefore, including morality in
the consideration of parental fitness may amount to giving a court free-range to make its
own judgments. 20 2
There is a second, and perhaps even more serious, problem raised by cases determining
custody based on moral concerns. Even if a court can properly conclude that particular
conduct is immoral, this would generally not be relevant to a custody case unless the
immorality of the parent is somehow related to harm to the child. Where courts reveal
their reasoning, the "harm" identified is that the child will fail to develop a proper moral
sense. In short, the decisions turn not only on assessment of a parent's immorality, but
also judicial assessment of what a parent chooses to teach her or his child." 3
Yet a parent's entitlement to teach the parent's own child right and wrong as the parent
sees fit lies at the core of the parental right to raise a child. The mere fact that a parent
raises a child to believe in a particular set of values cannot be the basis for state
interference with parental rights, unless it can further be shown that some real
harm-harm apart from the assertedly injurious belief system-will follow. In fact, we
recognize and protect the right of parents to teach their children religious beliefs of their
own choosing, to teach them the language they chose, and to teach them ideas as they
choose. 20
4
200. For example, the court did not judge that homosexuality was more immoral than fornication. This suggests that
the trial court's motivation was not in fact a genuine concern for the child, but rather bias against lesbians. See infra text
accompanying notes part IV.C.
201. If participation in consensual oral sex is a legitimate factor in determining custody cases in Virginia, then the
scope of inquiry into parental activity must be dramatically enlarged and notions of sexual privacy must be suspended
during custody cases. See Pershing, supra note 49, at 294-95 (noting that studies estimate that up to 90% of heterosexual
couples engage in oral sex).
202. See, e.g., Mnoldn, supranote 31, at 260-61; see also Fox v. Fox, Nos. 79676, 83590, 1995 WL 422057, at *2
(Okla. July 18, 1995) (noting that'"it is not the function of this Court to enter ajudgment based solely upon individualized
conceptions of morality").
203. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-11, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 at *7 (Mar. 30, 1988) (Tomlin, J.,
concurring). After quoting extensively from trial testimony, Judge Tomlin notes, with apparent distaste, that "Im]other
informed her daughter that she was a homosexual, stating that homosexual love is the same as heterosexual love." Id. at
*28. Judge Tomlin then concluded by stating:
The courts of this state have a duty to perpetuate the values and morals associated with the family and
conventional marriage, inasmuch as homosexuality is and should be treated as errant and deviant social
behavior. I would have this Court declare... that a practicing homosexual parent be disqualified from
obtaining legal custody of one's minor child or children.
Id. at *28-29. Judge Tomlin focused on "practicing" homosexuals because it was through "practice" that the mother taught
her child. Indeed, Judge Tomlin allowed that,
this Court would not be deciding that [m]other could never obtain custody of the child.... Just as an
alcoholic overcomes the habit and becomes a nondrinker, so this mother should attempt to dissolve her
'alterative lifestyle' ofhomosexual living. Such is not too great a sacrifice to expert [sic] of a parent in
order to gain or retain custody of his or her child.
Id. at *29.
204. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(recognizing "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
It is hard to imagine that a judge confronted with two heterosexual parents in a custody determination would be
permitted to rely on the fact that one parent might teach a child that same-sex relationships are deserving of respect and
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The difficulties discussed above suggest that until courts adopt a satisfactory analysis,
concerns about moral well-being ought not to be directly at issue in custody cases. 25 Yet
some state statutes specifically identify moral fitness of the parent or moral well-being
of the child as a factor relevant in the court's determination of custody. 206 In other
jurisdictions, courts have stated that "morality is always a factor" in child custody
actions. 2 7 Therefore, there will be many instances in which the law compels judges to
consider morality in custody cases. In doing so, however, courts should exercise extreme
caution when determining what constitutes immorality.
28
When immoral conduct is carefully identified, it should be relevant only to the extent
that it causes harm to the child, apart from harm in the form of diminished moral
judgment. "The law does not attend to traditional concepts of immorality in the abstract,
but only to whether the child is a party to, or is influenced by, such behavior."2 9 Thus,
acceptance. Yet, lesbian and gay parents are frequently penalized for teaching this same lesson. The deeply rooted
prejudices that lesbians and gay men must overcome are evidenced by judicial conduct, seemingly grossly wrong, which
is unprotested and accepted in cases involving lesbians and gay men.
205. 1 do not mean to suggest that morality is irrelevant to the rearing of childen. Although it is important, it appears
to be beyond the authority of the state to assess generally what moral teaching a parent can provide for her or his child.
206. Eighteen states have provisions requiring the consideration of the moral fitness of the parent, the moral well-being
of the child, or both, in statutes governing custody, visitation, modification of existing orders, and other related matters.
Five states require the consideration of morality in child custody determinations during divorce or separation proceedings:
Alabama, ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 31 (1994); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit.
43, § 109 (1990); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-445 (Supp. 1995); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10
(1995). Four states require the consideration of morality in motions to modify existing custody decrees: Arizona, ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1994); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-1115 (1983); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, para. 610 (1994);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994). Four states require the consideration of
morality in the determination of the noncustodial parent's visitation rights: Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, para. 607(a)
(1994); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616 (1994); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320(1) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1994); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-217(1) (1993). Three states require the consideration of morality
in the modification of the noncustodial parent's visitation rights: Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, para. 607(c) (1994);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320(3) (Michie/B obbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
217(3) (1993). Three states list the moral fitness of all parties as one factor to consider in determining the best interest of
the child: Louisiana, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (West 1995); Michigan, MICH. COwe. LAWS § 722.23 (Supp. 1995);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1993). Florida uses a moral fitness standard for purposes of determining
shared parental responsibility and primary residence. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13 (Supp. 1995). Hawaii allows the testimony of
any person or expert to be heard in a custody proceeding if that testimony is relevant to the moral well-being of the child.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1995). Illinois has a statute which presumes that the maximum involvement and cooperation
ofboth parents regarding the child's moral well-being is in the best interest of the child. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, para. 602
(1994). Montana has a statute which gives the court discretion to modify prior custody decrees if the child's moral health
is endangered. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-219 (1993). Nebraska has a statute which allows the court, in a divorce
proceeding, to terminate parental rights based on the potential moral detriment to the child if the pleadings or evidence
place termination in issue. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1986). Nevada has a statute which allows the court to grant
visitation rights to parents, grandparents, and siblings when a child's parents have divorced, separated, or relinquished their
parental rights, and takes into account the moral fitness of the party seeking visitation. NEV. REv. STAT. § 125A.330
(1993).
207. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164,165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41
(Utah 1982) (directing trial courts to consider parents' moral character).
208. See discussion infra part IV.C.
209. Neely, supra note 56, at 181; see Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37 (S.D. 1994). In rejecting the father's
suggestion that the court take the mother's immoral relationship into consideration, the court observed:
We are called upon to make ajudicial review of the trial court's decision rather than a moral evaluation
of the parties' conduct. As judicial officers, ruling on a legal controversy, we must be guided by
principles of law. Personal conceptions of morality held by the members of this Court have no place in
the resolution of this controversy.
Id. at 39. Although the opinion does not address the relevance of the trial judge's view of morality, it seems reasonable
to conclude that evaluation does not have a place in the resolution either. See also Developments in the Law, supra note
59, at 1639 (arguing that judges should avoid legislating their own sense of morality).
A number ofcourts have shown caution in evaluating morality in the context ofheterosexual parents. See, e.g., In re
Rex, 444 N.E.2d 482, 484 (rejecting reliance on mother's immorality unless it is established that there is some damage
to the child and requiring that damage be significant in character); Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1277 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1978) (stating that "immoral impact must be shown to have a direct or probable adverse impact on the welfare of
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judicial concern for the moral well-being of a child, even if mandated by the legislature,
cannot be used to support a blanket rule disadvantaging parents who engage in nonmarital
sex. While concern for a child's moral well-being may be understandable and genuine,
it is not within the power of a court to mandate that a child be raised with a particular
moral value system. Nor does a court have the authority to choose between the competing
value systems of the parents. 210 A court should only consider this factor when the asserted
immorality results in some other harm, or some real prospect of other harm, to the child.
C. Illegitimate Judicial Concern Grounded in Bias
and Prejudice
Often there are other, sometimes unarticulated concerns that motivate a judge's
decision in a custody case. Some judges are deeply biased against lesbians and gay men,
or less commonly, against individuals who engage in nonmarital heterosexual sex.2 ' For
these judges, taking children away from lesbian and gay parents may be perceived as
necessary without regard for any evidence. Denying custody or visitation may also serve
the additional purpose of punishing the parent for immoral or improper conduct. 21 2 Other
judges may be fearful of the reaction of the electorate or of specific communities within
the electorate or within which they live.21 3 Whether it is the judge's personal prejudice
or personal interpretation of community bias, neither is a legitimate basis for any judicial
decision, and both are particularly lamentable when the decision shapes the life of a child.
In some instances it is not hard to detect judicial prejudice. For example, in Pleasant
v. Pleasant214 the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge's order that harshly
restricted a lesbian mother's visitation with her child.2 5 During the course of the
proceedings, the post-decree judge heard testimony (consisting largely of hearsay) on the
father's motion to restrict visitation before the mother had been served. Following that
ex parte hearing, the judge issued an order suspending visitation because he was
concerned about "'this lesbian stuff.' 26 At a subsequent hearing, the judge argued with
the mother about the presence of "unmasculine" men at a gay pride parade (which
presumably the judge had not attended). 217 The judge ordered supervised visitation, but
offered the mother unsupervised visitation on the condition that the child was not in the
the child").
210. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
211. Bias and prejudice are by no means the special province of thejudiciary. Lesbians and gay men are the subject
of widespread bias and prejudice. See supra note 7-8 and accompanying text; see also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Ca. 1982) (noting an abundance of "[w]holly unfounded and
degrading stereotypes"), rev'd in par, vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). Bias leadsjudges to ignore evidence
contrary to their beliefs or to reach conclusions in the absence of evidence.
212. See, e.g., Whaley, 399 N.E.2d at 1273 (reversing the trial court order modifying custody in favor of father where
mother lived with a manied man, and finding that the trial court's decision "demonstrates that the change in custody was
ordered to punish Mrs. Whaley for conduct the court considered morally wrong").
213. For example, the nomination of Judith McConnell to be a U.S. District Court judge was withdrawn after it came
to light that in 1987 she had awarded custody of a 16-year-old boy to his deceased father's male lover rather than his
mother. Tony Perry, 2 Sponsored by Boxerfor US. Judgeships Withdrawfrom Consideration, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995,
at B3.
214. 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
215. The father had been awarded custody following a trial at which a child psychiatrist, suggested by a mediator,
recommended that the child remain in his mother's custody. Apparently no other expert offered an opinion as to custody.
Id. at 635. The mother openly acknowledged that she was a lesbian during the trial. Id.
216. Id. at 636 (quoting the post-decree judge).
217. Id. at 637 (quoting the post-decree judge).
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presence of any person of "known homosexual tendencies. 2 1' The mother explained that
she could not comply with this condition, and the judge terminated her visitation.21 9
Ultimately, the judge permitted only supervised visitation.
The appellate court also felt it was necessary to ensure that a different judge resolved
any future disputes in the case. 22 The appellate court concluded that
in making his findings, the judge improperly relied on his personal belief that
homosexuality creates serious endangerment. In his memorandum.., he included a
section entitled "HOMOSEXUALITY," which was based on a book that was not
introduced into evidence or even mentioned during the proceedings .... We are
disturbed by the judge's numerous homophobic comments. His personal beliefs
improperly clouded his judgment. Consequently, for the last four years, a little boy has
been deprived of unrestricted visits with his mother." '
The appellate court concluded that "[t]he record is replete with homophobic statements
that indicate that the judge was prejudiced.., and acted according to that prejudice. 222
If Pleasant is unusual, it is only because the trial judge made so little effort to hide his'
bias.' More typically, the bias of courts is less apparent, though no less real. In re
Marriage of Martins,24 for example, involved a motion for modification in a custody
dispute between a lesbian mother and a heterosexual father. The original custody decree
had awarded the mother physical custody of the children during the week. Some time
after learning that the mother was a lesbian, the father filed a motion to modify the
decree. At trial on the motion to modify, the father and mother each offered testimony
supportive of their own parenting relationship and critical of the other parent's.22S The
father testified that he believed homosexuality to be wrong, but that what people did
behind closed doors was their own business. He acknowledged that he had appeared on
Oprah Winfrey because "he did not want other people who might not know what their
sexual preference was to get into a marriage with a heterosexual and ruin the lives of their
spouse and children. '2 6 He also admitted that he left a derogatory message on the
mother's answering machine, knowing that the children had access to the machine.
227
After the mother informed him she was a lesbian, he arranged for the children, two girls,
then five and three, to receive counseling without the mother's knowledge.22 The court-
218. Id. The custody proceedings had already caused the mother to terminate her relationship with her lover. Id. at
637.
219. Id. Supervised visitation was restored two months later after a hearing where the mother explained that most of
her personal friends were lesbian or gay. Id. at 638.
220. Id. at 643.
221. ld. at 642.
222. Id. at 643.
223. See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring in part) (stating, with
reference to the lesbian mother, that "for years, [the lesbian mother] has followed a life of perversion" and suggesting that
[the lesbian mother] wants visitation so that she can teach the children to be homosexuals and that "[ulntil such time that
she can establish ... that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of abomination (see Leviticus 18:22), she should be totally
estopped from contaminating these children"); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-1, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 at *9 (Mar.
30, 1988) (Tomlin, ., concurring) (stating that "homosexuality is and should be treated as errant and deviant social
behavior" and comparing lesbian mother to an alcholic who "should attempt to dissolve her 'alternative life style' of
homosexual living").
224. 645 N.E.2d 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), cert. denied, 648 N.E.2d 418 (Il. 1995).
225. Id. at 570-72. The father was supported by his mother and the mother was supported by several long-term friends,
one of whom had also been her lover. Id. at 571.
226. Id. at 571.
227. Id.
228. Id at 569. The counselor was called to testily by the father at trial. She discussed various statements the children
had made concerning their residential preferences, but apparently did not discuss any difficulties that the children
experienced. Id at 570.
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appointed guardian testified in support of the father, based largely on the expressed
preferences of the children. 9 Finally, the trial judge interviewed the children in camera.
The younger child told the judge that she had no preference for residence with one parent
or the other, while the older child expressed some preference for the father, noting she
preferred her father's babysitter to that of her mother."
Based on this evidence, the trial court denied the motion to modify. Although the court
found a change in circumstances, it concluded that modification of custody was not
necessary to serve the best interests of the children."
Given the discretion allotted to trial courts in custody matters,232 the contested and
conflicting evidence before the court, and the trial court's unique ability to interview the
children, this would appear to be a decision warranting routine affirmance. Yet the
Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, granting the father's motion. The court reasoned that
"the trial court failed to evaluate fully the impact of the petitioner's lesbianism on the
children." '233 Unlike the trial court, the appellate court found clear and convincing
evidence that "[t]he petitioner's lifestyle had adversely affected the children. Since the
petitioner admitted her lesbianism, she had not spent as much time with or rendered the
same care to the minor children as she had prior to pronouncement of her gay life-
style." 234
Although the appellate court recites that the trial court's determination was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, this is insupportable given the many conflicts in the
evidence of the record. Indeed, the appellate court never discusses the weight of the
evidence, but instead substitutes its own judgment of the facts and of what is best for the
children.235 Even viewed as a de novo opinion on child custody, the court's opinion is
lacking, as the court fails to articulate ways in which the change of custody will advance
the interests of the children. The appellate court's failure to adhere to the proper standard
of review requires some explanation.
At least one explanation might lie in the bias of the appellate judges against lesbians
and gay men. Although it is subtle, there is evidence of consistent, though not necessarily
conscious, bias. For example, the court characterizes the mother's decision to
acknowledge to her family that she was a lesbian as her "pronouncement of her gay life-
style."" 6 This suggests that, in the court's view, the mother's decision was a trivial and
229. Id. By the time of trial the children were seven and five years old. Id. at 569.
230. Id. at 572.
23 1. Jd. at 573.
232. As the appellate court noted, Illinois law provides that atrial court determination sh uld be affirmed unless it
is against the manifest weight of the evidence or constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Seymour, 565
N.E.2d 269 (II1. App. Ct. 1990).
233. Martins, 645 N.E.2d at 573.
234. Id. at 574.
235. The court apparently resolves factual disputes without any justification. For example, the evidence showed that
the father a ranged for his children toenter counseling because he thought i necessary. The mother thought that counseling
was appropriate because the parents were unable to get along. When called totestify, the counselor did not offer testimony
as to any problems the children had encountered. Instead, she testified to several statements the children made to her
concerning where they preferred to live. Faced with this inconclusive and conflicting evidence, the appellate opinion
conclusorily states that "the children required counseling as a result of their mother's pronouncement of her lesbianism."
Id. at 574.
236. Id. In the same sentence the court states that the mother "admitted her lesbianism"--a formulation which clearly
implies that lesbianism is a bad thing. Id.
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selfish one." 7 Yet a lesbian mother's decision to openly acknowledge her sexuality is
neither trivial nor selfish. To the contrary, it is a difficult and irrevocable determination
which can have, as this case demonstrates, very serious legal consequences.25 The court's
trivialization of the mother's conduct demonstrates ignorance at best and intolerance at
worst.2 9
The court's deviation from its ordinary role of appellate review in custody cases,
combined with its failure to specifically articulate the basis for its conclusions about the
welfare of the children and the textual evidence suggestive of bias discussed above, raises
the clear possibility that the court's determination was based, at least in part, on
prejudice. At a minimum, any genuine concerns for the well-being of the children are
inextricably intertwined with suggestions of bias against lesbians. This is deeply
troubling. A decision based on bias and prejudice is an invalid one. More generally,
decisions which appear to be based on bias and prejudice, as well as those which are in
fact based on such factors, rob the courts of their legitimacy as decisionmakers.24
Custody decisions involving lesbian, gay, or unmarried heterosexual parents are often
replete with stereotypical images of the parties. One common stereotypical image of gay
men fixates on rapacious and uncontrolled sexual appetites. While the concern about
uncontrollable sex drives is more commonly associated with gay men, it also applies to
237. This view is further supported by the court's earlier discussion of the mother's conduct. The court first observes
that the mother "chose to disclose her lesbianism despite the effect it might have on the children." Id. at 571. The sentence
continues stating that "she had been afraid that the minor children were going to hear it from other children on the street!'
The court seems unable or unwilling to grant that the mother's fear coupled with her concern for her children might have
led her to make the difficult disclosure. See also Fajer, supra note 3, at 532 (noting use of the word "lifestyle" by
opponents of gay rights).
The language in Martins, 645 N.E.2d at 567, bears striking similarities to that employed by the trial court in Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). In Palmore, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed an order transferring custody to a father
because the mother had married an African-American man. (The mother and father of the child were both white.) The
mother had also lived with her new husband before they married. In ordering the change in custody, the trial court stated:
"The wife... has chosen for herself and for her child, a life-style unacceptable to the father and to
society.... It is of some significance... that the mother did see fit to bring a man into her home and
carry on a sexual relationship with him without being married to him. Such action tended to place
gratification of her own desires ahead of her concern for the child's future welfare."
Id. at 431 (quoting the trial court) (emphasis in original).
238. See Celia Kitzinger & Sue Wilkinson, Transitions from Heterosexuality to Lesbianism: The Discursive
Production of Lesbian Identities, 31 DEVELOPaMENTAL PSYCHOL. 95, 101 (1995) (noting that "[b]ecoming a lesbian
involves taking a leap into the unknown, claiming an outlaw identity" and noting costs of the decision). The risks incurred
by revealing one's sexual identity where custody of children may be at issue is widely known within the lesbian and gay
community.
239. Other portions of the Martins opinion also evidence bias, though perhaps not conscious bias. In discussing the
mother's roommates, two of whom were witnesses for her, the court identified them as "a lesbian by the name of Brcok"
and "a heterosexual named Helen." The court also noted that "two other lesbians, Michelle and Theresa, frequented the
home, but had not lived there." Martins, 645 N.E.2d at 569. Identification of the women as lesbian or heterosexual is of
no apparent importance to the resolution of the case, and the court does not discuss the sexual identities of any of the
father's witnesses. The evidence on which the court offers no comment is also noteworthy. For example, while the
mother's "pronouncement of her gay life-style" obviously troubles the court, the father's nationally televised appearance
on Oprah Winfrey-the subject of which was the mother's "life-style"--apparently does not.
Comparing the Martins case and Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (Il. App. Ct. 1993), also highlights a subsidiary
issue. Both cases were decided in Illinois by the intermediate appellate court, but they convey vastly different messages
to lesbian and gay parents. Together they create uncertainty and confusion.
240. Careful reading of many opinions reveals that prejudice may be at work. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams,
563 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (i. App. Ct. 1990) (characterizing the mother's conduct as showing her "propensity to feed her
sexual appetite without regard to morals, ethics, or law"); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (labelling
lesbianism a "deviate practice"), cert. denied451 U.S. 911 (1981); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990);
Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). It is not uncommon for courts to combine condemnation
for a lesbian mother's sexual conduct with tolerance and sometimes even sympathy for a heterosexual father's anti-gay
bias. See, e.g., Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 1196; Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 833 (N.D. 1993). This combination
is strongly indicative ofjudicial bias.
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lesbians.24' Lesbians and gay men are frequently portrayed as obsessed with sex, unable
to control their sexual desires. 242 This oversexualized image is particularly damaging in
the context of custody cases because of our overwhelming anxiety about children and
sexuality-at least nonmarital sexuality.
243
In sum, bias and prejudice, whether rooted in ignorance or in intolerance, appear to
play a substantial role in many custody cases involving lesbian and gay parents. Judges
disregard overwhelming and virtually uncontradicted evidence from the social sciences
and, in the absence of any case-specific evidence or even in the presence of contrary
evidence, rely on their own preexisting assumptions. The frequent invocations of concern
for a child's moral well-being-concerns premised on the initial conviction that the
parent is engaged in immoral conduct-support the inference that the adverse custody
decisions are primarily explicable in terms of judicial bias.
V. COMPONENTS OF A MEANINGFUL NEXUS TEST
The nexus test is the appropriate test for analyzing parental sexual conduct in custody
cases. The alternatives-a per se rule disqualifying or disfavoring lesbian and gay parents
without regard to their performance as parents or a permissible determinative inference
approach which allows the same results-do not serve the best interests of the child. Far
from it, these approaches often sacrifice the interests of particular children in order to
express judicial disapproval of parental conduct. 44 There is no support in the scientific
literature for treating sexuality differently than any other parental characteristic. Other
approaches should be discarded in favor of an effective nexus test.
Parental sexuality remains a controversial and divisive topic, particularly for lesbian
and gay parents. Therefore, to be effective the nexus test must incorporate explicit
restrictions that serve to provide careful guidance to trial courts. 241 It must constrain
freewheeling judicial discretion and focus the court's inquiry narrowly on the facts and
issues relevant to the well-being of the child.,46 Likewise, it must preclude consideration
of extraneous and potentially prejudicial matters.2 47
241. See, e.g., Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 1199 (noting the mother's "propensity to feed her sexual appetite without
regard to morals, ethics, or law").
242. See, e.g., Fajer, supra note 3, at 538-39.
243. The prospect that a custodial parent might remany and have a sexual life with a new spouse would never form
a basis for concern about continuing custody.
244. To the extent that adoption of approaches disadvantaging lesbian and gay parents reflects a desire to penalize
lesbian or gay sexual conduct, this desire would be better served by direct imposition of criminal penalties for such
conduct. Many states do just this through sodomy statutes. Yet sodomy statutes are rarely enforced, suggesting at least
ambivalence toward the appropriateness of sanctioning sexual conduct. Against this background, it is inappropriate for
a court to sanction indirectly (at considerable cost to a child) what could be sanctioned directly.
245. Professor Mnookin reached a similar conclusion-that indeterminate and discretionary standards should be
replaced by more clearly defined legal standards-in his groundbreaking article analyzing child custody determinations.
Mnoldn, supra note 31, at 277-81. Professor Mnookin offers a series of proposals aimed at reformulating the standards
by which the state may intervene to restrict or terminate parental rights. This is a distinct problem, related to but different
from a parental custody fight. Professor Mnookin's specific suggestions are nonetheless valuable and I have drawn on
them in formulating the proposals put forth here.
246. Id. at 268-72, 281-91 (outlining the dangers of indeterminacy and the need for clear standards).
247. In addition, systematic programs aimed at the education of judges are essential. Much of the bias and prejudice
experienced by lesbian and gay parents in custody cases can be traced to judicial ignorance. Judicial education can
encourage judges to eschew reliance on myths and stereotypical images in favor of reasoned assessment of the facts of
each case. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Ethicating JudgesAbout Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Simulation, 1 L. & SEXUALITY:
REv. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 173 (1991).
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The appropriate scope ofjudicial inquiry in a custody case where parental sexuality is
at issue must be clearly defined. Two distinct areas of inquiry are potentially permissible:
The sexual conduct of a parent to which a child is directly exposed and certain
characteristics of any other adult who will play a substantial role in a child's life as a
result of that adult's relationship with the parent. This is not to suggest that parental
sexual conduct or all characteristics of other adults should be open generally to judicial
investigation and assessment. To the contrary, consideration of parental conduct should
be sharply limited by the central principle of the nexus test; that is, conduct is relevant
only to the extent that it is linked to the well-being of the child. Similarly, characteristics
of other adults should be relevant only if they satisfy the nexus test.
In addition, if it is to function properly, the nexus test should clearly and narrowly
define what constitutes harm to the child. It should also require evidence of a specific
connection between the parental factor and the properly defined harm. The harm should
be shown to have occurred or to be reasonably likely to occur in the future. Courts should
not be left free to speculate about possible harm that might occur at some indefinite time
in the future. 2
4 8
Finally, trial courts should control the admission of evidence to minimize the extent
to which irrelevant evidence, which may be prejudicial, is admitted. Appellate courts
should stand ready to review applications of the nexus test by the lower courts carefully
and critically.
The following sections will detail the various components that comprise this Article's
proposed solution. Most of these components can be found in some cases, but no case
combines all of them, and no jurisdiction systematically demands them.
In several respects, the proposed analysis is similar to the analysis used by many courts
when the parental characteristic at issue is religion. Courts are extremely cautious when
a parent claims that custody or visitation of a child should turn, even in part, on the other
parent's religious beliefs and/or practices. In general, courts have been unwilling to place
restrictions on visitation or custody because of religious beliefs or practices absent "a
clear, affirmative showing that those religious activities will be harmful to the child." '249
The legal justification for judicial concern about custody decisions based on religious
belief and practice is rooted, in part, in the First Amendment protections afforded
religion. In that regard, the parental religion cases are readily distinguishable, for the
First Amendment provides a constitutional justification for the courts' critical assessment
of custody cases involving religion.
Yet, there are also compelling reasons for critical assessment of custody claims
involving parental sexuality. As this Article has argued, there is no legitimate basis for
general judicial hostility toward lesbian and gay parents. Nevertheless, cases involving
lesbian and gay parents are often decided not on their merits but on other, less desirable
grounds. Judges rely on stereotypical images of lesbians and gay men or base their
decisions on bias. In so doing, they compromise the best interests of the child. The
commitment to attaining the best interests of the children who are involved in custody
cases warrants particularly critical scrutiny of claims involving parental sexuality.
248. See Mnookin, supra note 31, at 258-62.
249. In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Ct. App. 1980); see also Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607
(Mass. 1981) (stating that "harm to the child from conflicting religious instructions or practices, which wouldjustify..
. limitation [on the family relationship], would not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be demonstrated in detail"
(citations omitted)).
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In addition, the arguments presented by parents seeking to restrict custody or visitation
of religious parents bear some striking similarities to the arguments presented by parents
seeking to restrict custody or visitation of sexually nonconforming parents-that the
children will suffer moral injury, that they will be stigmatized, or that they may suffer
some ill-defined future harm. As with sexuality, a parent's religion usually has two
elements: belief or identity and practice or conduct. Thus, the analysis developed in the
religion and custody cases is useful in addressing the same problems when they arise in
a different context.
250
A. The Appropriate Areas of Judicial Inquiry
1. The Sexual Activity
Direct exposure to a parent's intimate sexual conduct may be detrimental to the child's
well-being. Thus, consideration of the conduct to which the child has been directly
exposed may be appropriate under the nexus test.25' In evaluating the significance of
particular conduct to which a child has been exposed, a court must discriminate between
intimate sexual conduct, exposure to which might harm a child, and gestures of affection,
exposure to which may contribute to a child's understanding of human relationships and
thus to the child's well-being.
This distinction may be difficult to articulate.252 But most critically, courts must
recognize that it is a distinction that turns on the specific conduct involved and not on the
sex of the participants engaged in the conduct. Conduct which would be inappropriate for
a married heterosexual couple is also inappropriate for a lesbian or gay couple.
Conversely, conduct in which a married heterosexual couple may engage in front of their
children should also be appropriate for a lesbian or gay couple. Given a focus on a
child's well-being, there is simply no basis for a determination that it is acceptable for
a child to be in the presence of a man and a woman holding hands but unacceptable to be
in the presence of two women holding hands. No evidence supports such disparate
treatment. Lesbian and gay parents and heterosexual parents should be held to the same
standards of conduct. A requirement of uniform standards would do much to improve the
position of children of lesbian and gay parents as well as the parents themselves, for the
conduct at issue in most cases is conduct which is readily seen as innocuous if engaged
in by a heterosexual couple.
250. For example, courts generally agree that harm to the child will justify restrictions on religious instruction or
practices, despite the protections afforded by the Constitution. The constitutional protection of religion mandates, however,
that harm which would justify limitations should not be assumed or surmised, but must instead be demonstrated in detail.
See, e.g., Felton, 418 N.E.2d at 607. This same requirement-that harm should not be presumed or surmised but must
instead be demonstrated in detail-is warranted by a genuine concern for the best interests of the child in any area where
prejudice and ignorance may otherwise lead a court to hasty and ill-founded conclusions.
I do not wish to overlook the irony of relying on cases involving religious belief to improve the position of lesbian and
gay parents. Religious beliefs are far more frequently invoked to justify inequitable treatment of lesbians and gay men.
See. e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
251. At the same time, the mere fact that a parent identifies herself as a lesbian is not generally relevant to a
determination of custody. This is precisely the distinction accepted in cases revolving around a parent's religion.
252. This project is beyond the scope of this Article. Presumably, in determining where to draw the line a court might
rely on available social science literature which in turn might depend in part on prevailing cultural norms.
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2. The New Person
If a parent establishes a relationship with a new person such that the new person will
have significant contact with the child, it is appropriate for the court to take note of this
situation. 3 The court may properly consider some characteristics of the new person. For
example, if a parent's new partner or roommate254 is a drug addict, or perhaps even a
cigarette smoker, a court may have some legitimate basis for inquiry. The child's
exposure to a person with those characteristics might, depending on the evidence, be
shown to present the appropriate level of risk to the child."5 But characteristics such as
race, religion, or sexual identity provide no basis for generalized court concern. There is
no potential for harm to the child from exposure to these characteristics.
In addition, in some cases the specific relationship between the child and the new
person may be a legitimate focus ofjudicial concern. If the new person and the child have
an antagonistic or abusive relationship, judicial inquiry is obviously warranted. But as
long as the relationship between the new person and the child is not shown to be
detrimental to the child, the court should not intervene on that basis." 6
B. Clear Definition of Harm
The nexus test should require that harm be narrowly and specifically identified. It
should explicitly preclude courts from relying on nebulous allusions to ill-defined harm.
This is consistent with the social science research, which demonstrates that no generally
identifiable harm afflicts the children of lesbian and gay parents. The research establishes
that harm does not generally follow from a lesbian mother associating with other lesbians,
from a lesbian mother being open and honest with her children about her sexual identity,
or from a mother having an intimate and loving relationship with another woman in the
home. To the contrary, social science studies suggest that genuine concern with the best
interest of the child should lead courts to foster situations where: (1) a child is aware of
his or her parent's sexual identity; (2) the parent is open and comfortable with her or his
sexual identity; (3) the child and parent are part of the lesbian and gay community and
know other children of lesbians and gay men; (4) the child is able to talk to peers, family
members, and outsiders about the parent's sexual identity; and (5) the parent is open and
emotionally intimate with a long-term partner, if a partner is living in the home. The
court should adopt a narrow definition of harm so that behavior that is in fact in the best
interest of the child cannot be used against a parent in a custody suit.
A narrow definition of harm will also prevent the imposition of custody or visitation
conditions that impair a parent's ability to care for her or his children.257 Because of
misconceptions about what harms children, lesbian mothers and gay fathers have often
253. This is particularly true where the parent proposes to live with the new person.
254. The relationship need not be a sexual one.
255. It might also be that the child's interests could be served by carefully crafted court orders-limiting the child's
exposure to cigarette smoke, for example.
256. While recognizing the legitimacy of judicial concerns in this area, appellate courts must also remain vigilant
against pretext and bias. A court cannot insist on perfect relationships, and some deference to the judgment of the parent
about the appropriateness of the relationship is warranted.
257. It is sad and ironic that many state courts, in their haste assertedly to protect children, impose conditions on
custody or visitation that are actually likely to cause the children harm. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
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been placed in the precarious position of balancing what their children need against what
society and the courts will allow. 28 A court should require a specific showing of
particular harm, not general conclusions or speculation.
259
The definition of harm should make explicit that stigma is not, in and of itself, harm.
Though children of lesbian mothers and gay fathers must deal with the issue of social
stigma, there is generally no distinguishable negative effect on the children's self-esteem
and social adjustment. In fact, children may gain greater tolerance for differences and
respect for their parents' willingness to stand up for their beliefs. The available studies
demonstrate that lesbian and gay parents are cognizant of their sexual orientation's
impact on their children and attempt to shield their children from negative societal
messages; they are vigilant about maintaining the integrity of their families.260
While physical and emotional harm are proper subjects for court inquiry,26" ' courts
should be extremely wary of reliance on moral injury or harm to justify custody or
visitation orders. Parents have a fundamental right to educate their children, including
the right to communicate their moral and religious values to them.262 The fact that a
particular judge, or even a majority of a state's citizens, would choose to raise their own
children with a different set of moral or religious beliefs, or that the judge or the citizens
do not approve of a parent's moral or religious beliefs should not constitute harm to a
child. Courts should be scrupulous in restricting the definition of harm to exclude this
rationale. Cases concerning sexual morality should be governed by those concerning
religious belief, as the overlap between the two concerns is clear.
263
C. Evidence of Harm and of a Link Between Harm
and Conduct
The nexus test should require that the party seeking to restrict custody on the basis of
sexuality bear the burden of producing clear and positive evidence 6f harm or of some
specific future harm to the child. General testimony or findings about unspecified harm
that might occur are not sufficient to justify reliance on sexuality as a factor in
258. See Lott-Whitehead & Tully, supra note 152, at 275.
259. See, e.g., Robertson v. Robertson, 575 P.2d 1092, 1093 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (finding the record inadequate
when it contained only an affidavit of the mother stating that religious teachings "confuse and alarm" children and "have
a detrimental and confusing impact upon [their] welfare" and noting that courts must require a 'factual showing, not mere
conclusions and speculations" (emphasis in original)).
260. See Lott-Whitehead & Tully, supra note 152, at 276.
261. But see Mncokin, supra note 31, at 277-79 (advocating that the consideration of danger to a child's health be
limited to physical health, precluding consideration of emotional harm).
262. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
263. See Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992). In Pater, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a custody fight
between parents of differing religions. The court accepted the assumption that the mother, a Jehovah's Witness, would
prevent the child from participating in various extracurricular activities and from socializing with non-Witnesses. The
father argued that this would harm the child because it might subject the child to ostracism and because it would interfere
with proper socialization of the child. The court rejected the father's arguments because it recognized that the arguments
essentially recapitulated the underlying dispute over appropriate moral and religious beliefs. The court concluded that "[a]
showing that a child's mental health will be adversely affected requires more than proof that a child will not share all of
the beliefs or social activities of the majority of his or her peers." Id at 799. Interestingly, the court relied on a case arising
out of concerns about parental sexuality. Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
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determining custody.2" Instead, a court should require a clear and affirmative showing
of harm.
265
Neither should unfounded speculation about future harm be used to justify a court's
decision. Proof of an immediate and substantial risk of harm2"6 or, at a minimum, proof
that the conduct has or reasonably will have an adverse impact on the child261 should be
required. To permit judicial action on a more speculative basis is to risk the best interests
of the child. Custody decrees are, after all, subject to modification. In the event that some
harm which was not originally immediate or reasonably likely becomes imminent,
modification might be appropriate. Prediction of harm in the future is difficult, if not
impossible. 6 1 Allowing a court to rely on the possibility of future harm simply opens the
door to judicial speculation, speculation which is often tainted by bias and prejudice.
Courts should also be diligent in attempting to separate harm that might be caused by
one parent's sexual conduct from harm which is caused by the other parent's reaction to
the sexual conduct. If it can be shown that there is harm attributable to a parent's sexual
conduct, then that may be taken into account in determining custody. But if in fact the
harm is caused by the other parent's reaction to the sexual conduct, that is appropriately
considered as a factor weighing against the reacting parent. A parent can control his or
her reaction and therefore, in appropriate cases, that reaction may properly be considered
conduct which harms the child.
264. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P2d 875 (Alaska 1985). In SNE, the Alaska Supreme Court explained that "the
scope ofjudicial inquiry is limited to facts directly affecting the child's well-being." Id at 878. While there was extensive
evidence that the mother was a lesbian, there was no suggestion that this had an adverse impact on the child. Under these
circumstances, the lower court's reliance on the fact that the mother was a lesbian was impermissible.
265. Here again, the standard I propose is similar to that used in cases involving religion. See In re Marriage of
Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846-47 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing cases requiring a clear, affirmative showing that religious
activities will harm the child); Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861 (Idaho 1977) (requiring that harm from religious
upbringing be demonstrated by a clear, affirmative showing); Kirehner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257 (Md. 1992) (using the
same standard as Compton, although upholding restrictions based on trial record); Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606 (Mass.
1981) (using the same standard as Compton but also requiring that the harm to the child from conflicting religious
instructions of the parents be demonstrated in detail and not assumed or surmised); Khalsa v. Khalsa, 751 P.2d 715 (N.M.
Ct. App.) (using the same standard as Compton but noting that general testimony that child is upset or confused is
insufficient), cen. denied, 751 P.2d 700 (N.M. 1988); Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1987) (using the same
standard as Compton); Paler, 588 N.E.2d 794; Munozv. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1971) (using the same standard
as Complon).
In a number of these cases, the courts reverse trial court rulings on the basis ofinsufficient evidence of the harm and
links between the harm and the parental characteristics or conduct in question. Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, is exemplary.
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted that
the evidence is manifestly insufficient. Boiled down, it simply consists of testimony by the mother
concerning her distress at appellant's religious activities with the children and speculative testimony by
a counselor who had never seen or interviewed the children. There was evidence that the boy had social
adjustment problems in school for which he had received psychological counseling, but no evidence
relating these problems, or periodic stomach aches which both children assertedly suffered, to conflict
over religion.... The record contains no competent evidence that the children will in the future be
harmed by the parental religions conflict.
Id. at 847. The appellate court's close scrutiny of the evidence advanced in support of restricting parental rights is
noteworthy. It is far more rigorous than that generally employed in cases involving parental sexuality. Notably, the dissent
in Meniry criticizes the majority for overstepping the bounds ofjudicial review. See id. at 850 (Miller, J., dissenting).
266. This standard is similar to that advocated by Professor Mnookin as the appropriate standard for removing the
child from the home. Mnookin, supra note 31, at 277-79. Professor Mnookin suggests that the court must find "an
immediate and substantial danger to the child's health" and limits health to physical health. Id. He proposes this very
restrictive standard for cases involving state termination or restriction of parental rights, not for use in custody disputes.
The same standard would be inappropriate. Nonetheless, the reasoning identified by Professor Mnookin justifies adoption
of a similar, even if weaker, standard here. As with termination cases, lesbian and gay parents face judicial discrimination
and ignorance generated, in part, by the personal values of many in the judiciary.
267. S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879.
268. Mnookin, supra note 31, at 277-79, 287.
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
To the extent that a link between parental sexual conduct and harm to the child is
established, any order restricting custody or visitation should be designed so as to
eliminate the harmful conduct without restricting conduct not shown to be harmful.2 69
That is, orders must be narrowly tailored in view of the specific harms established.
D. Procedural Safeguards
Typically, rules of evidence may be informally applied in custody cases. This poses
particular dangers in custody matters centering on parental sexuality. Evidence of a
parent's specific sexual practices is not generally relevant to any inquiry under a well-
defined nexus test.2 17 Such evidence may, however, inflame the prejudices of a particular
judge. Beyond that, the search for such evidence is both highly intrusive and potentially
offensive and intimidating. Therefore, any effective nexus test must strictly limit the
admissible (and hence discoverable) evidence.27'
E. Careful Appellate Review
As is noted above, appellate review of custody determinations is, for the most part,
extremely deferential. Appellate courts generally affirm trial courts when alternative
grounds supporting the trial court's decision exist. Cursory review compounds existing
problems in custody cases. Appellate courts must signal their willingness to perform
detailed reviews of custody cases in order to ensure effective application of the nexus
test.
To permit effective appellate review and to ensure proper application of the nexus test,
the trial court should be required to provide detailed findings supporting each of the
factors required under the nexus test. 2 An appellate court should begin its review with
careful scrutiny of these findings as well as the supporting evidence.
The appellate court should also examine the lower courts' attitudes towards the
nonconforming parent. This requires an appellate court to look beyond findings or
opinions of the lower courts to an examination of the record,2" for in some instances the
record itself may reveal significant bias not apparent from the court's formal conclusions.
Appellate courts should take note of reliance on stereotypical images of lesbians, gay
men, and unmarried but sexually active heterosexuals.
Reviewing courts should be alert to the appearance of subtle prejudice as well as to its
blatant manifestations. This is particularly important where a lower court has relied on
concerns about a child's moral well-being. A decision that rests on ajudge's conclusion
that a lesbian mother will endanger the moral well-being of her child typically rests on
the judge's presupposition that a lesbian mother is immoral or that lesbians are immoral,
269. See Kirchner, 606 A.2d 257 (holding that limitations imposed by the trial court are at once too broad and too
narrow because they do not correspond to conduct shown to be harmful).
270. For example, the number of times per week a parent might engage in particular sexual practices is of no
significance unless it is established that the child is directly exposed to or involved in that conduct.
271. Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 800-01 (Ohio 1992) (noting that the scope of the inquiry into the religious beliefs
and practices of the mother was improper and an abuse of discretion).
272. See Mnookin, supra note 31, at 279; Schneider, supra note 56, at 2294.
273. In the context of religion, courts have observed ajudge's predisposition or bias from the record. See. e.g., Felton
v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1981) (noting the trial judge's apparent predisposition); Paler, 588 N.E.2d at 801 ("The
isolated statements of the trial judge that he would not decide custody on the basis ofthe mother's religious beliefs will
not insulate the court's decision from review.").
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as opposed to a specific judgment of the particular lesbian mother formed during the trial.
A presupposition that one of the parties is immoral is the essence of judicial bias.
Where a trial court has evidenced bias against one of the parents, appellate courts
should engage in extremely critical review. To do less is an abdication of appellate
responsibility. A biased factfinder cannot be relied upon to find unbiased facts. When the
mother simply being a lesbian offends a court, or when a court adjudges her immoral, its
assessment that the mother is a less than adequate parent for other reasons-for example,
because she failed to do the dishes or was an inadequate housekeeper-cannot be
accepted at face value. The demonstrated bias of the court renders these subsidiary
findings suspect.2 4 Unless a reviewing court can be confident that the lower court's
biases have not infected the deliberative process, it should not affirm the judgment of
those courts.2" An appellate court should assert its authority to correct such an abuse of
discretion or to remand the case for appropriate proceedings, if necessary, before an
unbiased trial court.
27 6
CONCLUSION
Given the widespread public and political controversies surrounding lesbian and gay
parenting, courts should take special care to ensure that lesbian and gay parents are
treated fairly in custody cases. The general trend towards adoption of a nexus test
governing lesbian and gay parents is one step towards this goal. But adoption of the basic
principles of the nexus test does not guarantee fair treatment."
Courts should do more than endorse the general principles of the nexus test. They
should adopt a carefully crafted and detailed version of the nexus test and insist upon its
rigorous application. Skewed judicial consideration motivated by prejudice or by ill-
defined and ill-founded concerns that lesbian and gay parents may somehow harm their
children must be replaced by reasoned and fact-based analysis. Nothing less will protect
the interests of children of lesbian and gay parents, who may otherwise be separated
needlessly from their parents, as well as the interests of lesbian and gay parents
themselves.
274. See Mnookin, supra note 31, at 268-70 (noting the problem of bias in the child custody context).
275. In cases involving religion, the trial court's failure to demand a clear, affirmative showing of harm constitutes
an abuse of discretion warranting appellate intervention. See Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135-36 (Wash. 1971).
276. Id at 1135 (noting that it is a manifest abuse of discretion when the trial court does not show a compelling reason
for failing to follow the established rule of noninterference in religious matters in child custody).
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